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This thesis explores the history of events in Rhode Island connected to the 
1934 General Textile Strike.  During the strike, two people were killed by soldiers of 
the Rhode Island National Guard in an event known as “The Saylesville Massacre.”  
The established historiography of the 1934 General Textile Strike does not tell the 
story of the Saylesville Massacre well. Despite claims to the contrary, the strike was 
poorly run and lost by the union.  Through a careful reading of primary sources this 
thesis argues that only by understanding the 1934 General Textile Strike as a loss for 
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On September 1, 1934, the United Textile Workers of America (UTW) began a 
nationwide strike against the American cotton textile industry.  More than 500,000 
workers walked off the job, making the 22-day long strike one of the largest labor 
actions in American history. While national in scale the bulk of the workers impacted 
were in the American South, New England, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.1  During 
the strike in Rhode Island violent clashes between workers and security forces resulted 
in four deaths. In the small textile village of Saylesville, Rhode Island, confrontations 
between neighborhood residents, area workers, and security forces led to a week-long 
street battle resulting in dozens of arrests, the wounding of scores, and the deaths of 
two men - Charles Gorcynski and William Blackwood - in an incident known in 
Rhode Island labor lore as “The Saylesville Massacre.” 
 The historiography of the 1934 textile workers strike includes references to the 
confrontations in Saylesville, particularly during the peak of the action between 
September 7 and September 12, but the Saylesville Massacre is not explored in great 
depth.  Most scholars properly catalogue the incident as one of the most violent of the 
strike but because the Saylesville Massacre is one of many violent incidents in a 
national strike, not enough detail is provided to properly explain why Saylesville 
turned so viciously violent. This thesis seeks to remedy this historiographical gap.  
After introductory remarks providing historical background about the village of 
Saylesville and factory at the center of the story, this thesis will explore the national 
circumstances prompting the strike. The thesis will describe the union leading the 
 
1 John A. Salmond, The General Textile Strike of 1934: From Maine to Alabama (Columbia: University 




strike along with the men leading the union. My attention will then shift towards the 
events of the strike in Rhode Island.  
In a way it is understandable not much is known about the Saylesville 
Massacre.  The key primary source about the strike in Rhode Island is the state’s daily 
newspaper, The Providence Journal. The newspaper is known for its anti-union 
animus and during the strike its slanted coverage of the events is clear.  But the 
newspaper’s more direct impact on the record are the poorly written and badly edited 
stories about the strike.  While it may be understandable a newspaper trying to publish 
up-to-the-minute accounts of the movements of thousands of people would sacrifice 
complete accuracy for the sake of current information, the newspapers stories written 
during the actual events are nearly incoherent.  Stories beginning with the events of 
one day make unexplained, non-linear leaps to other days or other times within the 
same day. Researchers looking broadly at the events of the strike can be forgiven for 
not being able to put the pieces of the puzzle together. 
 Another reason for the lack of scholarly attention on the Saylesville Massacre 
could also be the lack of records with the union at the center of the story – the UTW.  
Textile unions never enjoyed significant density in Rhode Island and while the UTW 
claimed at the time of the strike to have over 50 local unions in the state, most of them 
appear to be very small. Also, in the years just after the strike, the UTW was torn apart 
in the battles between the American Federation of Labor and the newly formed 
Congress of Industrial Organizations.  The small organization became smaller through 




But these barriers are not the real reason why the Saylesville Massacre is 
nearly forgotten and misremembered in labor history.  My thesis is the strike in Rhode 
Island was disorganized and poorly run and directly contributed to the deaths in the 
Saylesville Massacre. The year 1934 saw several massive strikes around the country, 
many of them resulting in significant victories for the working class, but the national 
textile strike was lost by the union and its members.  In Rhode Island, the strike was 
an embarrassment to the labor movement and to Governor Theodore Francis “TF” 
Green, a Democrat and supporter of the New Deal. For both the labor movement and 
the governor to continue their path to political power in the state, the facts of the 
textile strike and the events in Saylesville needed to be swept aside; so, they were. 
 This thesis presents three arguments.  First, the established historiography has 
not told the story of the Saylesville Massacre or the events of 1934 textile strike in 
Rhode Island particularly well.  By accepting the union’s declaration of victory at the 
conclusion of the strike scholars have ignored some obvious facts about the union’s 
ineffective conduct of the strike.  The UTW was woefully unprepared to engage in a 
strike of this magnitude. They had neither the staff nor the financial resources to 
confront a complicated industry on a national scale.  The union’s track record in major 
confrontations was abysmal and they did not demonstrate any meaningful steps to 
prepare for the national strike.  Despite claims by some that the union was well 
organized in Rhode Island, I will show that it was not. The disorganization contributed 
to the tragedy on the streets of Saylesville.  
 Secondly, the strike was a loss, and Labor History as a discipline should 




and Cletus Daniel, discussed below, do an admirable job of explaining the deficits of 
the UTW, but more research is required to understand the impact of the loss of the 
strike.   One area for future scholars to consider is how the defeat of the textile strike 
impacted southern workers attitudes towards unionizing for generations to come. Did 
the failure of the union to adequately support the striking workers contribute to the 
failure of subsequent organizing efforts in the South?  Yes is a reasonable answer but 
to explore this hypothesis, one must first approach the strike as lost by the union. That 
means challenging the union’s claims which, at least in the Rhode Island context, I do 
below. 
 Finally, it is important for the labor movement to accept the 1934 textile strike 
as a loss to learn from its mistakes. The historiography of 1934 details a huge upswing 
in working-class activism, the roots of which are explored below.  However, given the 
union organizing victories of that year, it is tempting to either shunt aside the details of 
the textile strike and the ineptitude of the union leading it, or worse, drift into 
hagiography about the year “labor erupted.”   Leading working women and men out of 
their workplace and onto the picket lines is potentially putting workers in harm’s way.  
It is not a decision to be taken lightly and holding up the Saylesville Massacre as a 
cautionary tale can help instruct union organizers on factors they need to take into 
consideration before launching a strike. Perhaps the primary factory for consideration 
when calling a strike is the strength of the union as an organization, not just as an idea.  
Strikes, and standing up to the boss, the cops, and the military can be thrilling and a 




The UTW never should have called the national textile strike of 1934.  They 
were bullied into the action by a rank-and-file justifiably angry at their mistreatment in 
the workplace but who did not adequately appreciate the task before them.  The Union 
knew they were not ready, but they forged ahead anyway, and in Saylesville, two 
workers were killed as a result. The UTW members, most of whom joined the union 
only months before the strike was announced, also bear some responsibility for the 
strike’s failure.  Not because they lacked resolve or a sense of solidarity - both were 
clearly on display - but because no matter how strong one’s sense of union 
comradeship is felt, it will not stop the effects of tear gas in the lungs or bullet wounds 






     Saylesville is one of hundreds of former mill villages dotting industrial New 
England. Nestled in between Rhode Island rural highway routes 122 and 126, the 
village is one of the six in the town of Lincoln, five miles north of Providence, and 
bordering the city of Central Falls.2  Originally known as “World’s End,” the village 
officially became Saylesville in 1881 when Samuel Fessenden was assigned 
postmaster to the newly opened post office to serve the community of workers and 
managers of the expanding bleachery business of brothers William F. and Frederick C. 
Sayles. By the time of the naming of Saylesville, the W.F. & F.C. Sayles Co. was the 
largest bleachery company in the world.3  
In 1934, the bleachery at the heart of the village was called the Sayles 
Finishing Plant.  At the time, bleacheries were a crucial link in the textile industry 
supply chain, processing raw cotton to make it clean and white.  Bleaching textiles in 
the early twentieth century was still an ancient, somewhat occult, trade.  One writer 
describes the process as ‘surrounded by such an aura of mystery’ with routines passed 
from father to son like secret recipes.4 Made modern in the eighteenth century with the 
introduction of chemicals such as chlorine, the process retained many ancient 
characteristics.  For example, a critical step in the process is known as ‘souring.’  In 
the early twentieth century souring involved treating boiled cotton with a chlorine-
based mixture known as ‘chemic’ but in earlier times “souring” was accomplished by 
 
2 Quinnville, Limerock, Fairlawn, Manville, and Albion are the others. 
3 Mildred Laxton, Saylesville (Lincoln, Rhode Island: Lincoln Public Library), undated.  
4 J. T. Marsh, An Introduction to Textile Bleaching (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1948). 




washing boiled cotton through buttermilk.5  It is easy to imagine the inside of the 
bleachery looking like an industrial scale mad scientist laboratory complete with 
bubbling cauldrons, jets of water and steam, chutes, box folders, and dripping, stinking 
rolls of cotton hanging from rafters above the heads of workers using large wooden 
sticks to stir treated fabric through caustic pots of soapy solution. The odors of sugar, 
chlorine, and burnt vegetables waft through the air, letting everyone in the factory, and 
the surrounding neighborhood, know exactly what step of the process was underway.6 
Working at the bleachery was tough, smelly labor and tensions periodically 
boiled over into conflict. In the fall of 1905, the Saylesville workers went on strike for 
better pay.  The strike began in the folding room of the plant after workers, paid $10 
per week, demanded a ten-percent pay increase.  The workers were angry with the 
company for hiring Henry Laurence Gantt, an expert in so-called Scientific 
Management. Gantt was recommended to bleachery management by Frederick Taylor, 
the founder of Scientific Management as someone who could transform Sayles’ 
company from a collection of foreman-led fiefdoms into a modern enterprise. 
According to Gantt’s biographer L.P. Alford, the workers chafed at Gantt’s methods 
and in late October, 1905, the rise in tensions prompted a walkout.7 Strikes against 
Scientific Management were common in the early twentieth century, as Hugh Aitken 
points out in Scientific Management in Action: Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal, 
 
5 Ibid.  
6 Stabler, Herman and Pratt, Gilbert H., The Purification of some Textile and Other Factory Wastes 
(Washington, DC.: Department of the Interior, United States Geological Survey, [1909]), 27-29. 
7 L. P. Alford, Henry Laurence Gantt: Leader in Industry, 1st ed. (New York, New York: The 




1908-1915 about a similar strike in 1911, in Watertown, Massachusetts.8  A 1905 
trade publication, American Wool & Cotton Reporter, wrote that after several weeks 
of the strike the workers “profess to have no fear of the results” and on November  17, 
The Boston Daily Globe reported the workers won their all of their demands, including 
a reduction from 60 to 58 weekly working hours without loss of pay.9 
Seventeen years later a statewide strike of Rhode Island textile factory hands 
started when factory owners announced a statewide 20-percent wage cut.  Area textile 
workers, mostly without formal union support, spontaneously abandoned their looms 
and walked off the job.  On February 4, over a thousand workers marched three miles 
from the neighboring city of Pawtucket to Saylesville, hoping to parade in front of the 
bleachery.  Several inches of freshly fallen snow did not stop the marchers, but reports 
vary about their reception when they arrived in Saylesville.  Susan Jaffee tells us in 
her master’s thesis “Ethnic Working Class Protest: The Textile Strike of 1922 in 
Rhode Island” how local media reported one hundred of the Saylesville workers 
joined the pickets while the UTW, which had a small loom fixers local at the plant, 
claimed 500-600 workers joined in.10 Despite the divergent numbers, at least for a 
time the bleachery was closed.  
     The national conditions leading up to the textile strike of 1934 are 
extensively discussed in scholarly works like The Turbulent Years: A History of the 
 
8 Hugh G.J. Aitken, Scientific Management in Action: Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal, 1908-1915. 
Course Book ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014. muse.jhu.edu/book/34265. 
9 No author, “untitled,” American Wool and Cotton Reporter, Vol. XIX, No. 45, (Boston, New York, & 
Philadelphia), November 16, 1905, 9. "Saylesville Hands Return." The Boston Daily Globe, November 
18, 1905.  
10 J Susan E. Jaffe "Ethnic Working Class Protest: The Textile Strike of 1922 in Rhode Island,” 




American Worker, 1933-1940, by Irving Bernstein; Testing the New Deal: The 
General Textile Strike of 1934 in the American South, by Janet Irons; Culture of 
Misfortune: An Interpretive History of Textile Unionism in the United States by Cletus 
Daniel, and The General Textile Strike of 1934: From Maine to Alabama, by John 
Salmond.11 The consensus in the literature about the national textile strike of 1934 is 
the hopes of workers to find relief from the depravations of the Great Depression by 
organizing unions, as envisioned in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 were 
dashed by stiff employer opposition. Only a strike on a national scale could possible 
address this injustice. 
A key provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act was Section 7(a), 
which for the first time in American legislative history gave the federal government’s 
legal support to union organizing.  The section read in part: 
…employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from 
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their 
agents, in the designation of such representatives or in the self-
organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.12  
 
However, even though Section 7(a) played a role in sparking workers' interests in 
union organizing, the law was quickly viewed by workers as a ‘broken promise’ given 
how hard employers fought back against union organizing efforts.  As a result, 
 
11 Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933-1940 (Chicago, 
Illinois: Haymarket Books, 2010).  Janet Christine Irons, Testing the New Deal: The General Textile 
Strike of 1934 in the American South (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000).  Cletus 
E. Daniel, Culture of Misfortune: An Interpretive History of Textile Unionism in the United States 
(Ithaca: ILR Press, 2001).  
John A. Salmond, The General Textile Strike of 1934: From Maine to Alabama (Columbia: University 
of Missouri Press, 2002). 




Bernstein tells us, “In 1934, labor erupted.” The year was marked by over 1,800 
strikes involving almost a million and a half workers across the country.13 
The Turbulent Years is a long and comprehensive review of the ebbs and flows 
of worker organizing during the first eight years following the initial inauguration of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt as President of the United States on March 4, 1933.  The 
book offers a comprehensive review of the other key strikes of 1934, including the 
Toledo Auto-Lite strike, the Minneapolis Teamster strike, and the West Coast 
Longshoremen strikes.  He rightly includes the national textile strike led by the UTW 
as one of the key events in this year of heavy strike activity, explaining the strike was 
prompted by textile manufacturers deliberately undermining the spirit and intent of 
Section 7(a).       
  Interestingly, Daniel’s Culture of Misfortune claims that while Section 7(a) 
was indeed a turning point for organized labor’s ambitions to organize on a large 
scale, it was considered a throw-away, last minute addition to the bill during drafting 
and the legislation’s sponsors did not conceive it would lead to massive organizing of 
the depression era proletariat.14 Daniel’s book discusses elements of the 1934 strike, 
but its major subject is the UTW itself, an organization he describes as having an 
“unfortunate genius for self-destruction.” Daniel’s comprehensive understanding of 
the UTW is critical to explaining their role in leading the textile strike, especially their 
“Ox-cart tactics in an automobile age.”15  It is a point seconded by Richard Kelly in 
 
13 Bernstein, 35 and 217. 
14 Daniels, 40. 




his book Nine Lives For Labor where he characterizes the UTW as “born in debt and 
died in bankruptcy.”16  
Irons’ Testing the New Deal takes an equally dim view of the UTW.  Her book 
documents the various factions tugging at the union and its leadership, but critically, 
locates the national strike in the context of a northern based union with an increasingly 
large and restive southern membership. Meticulously documented and supplemented 
with personal interviews of southern strike survivors, Irons’ work focuses specifically 
on the southern worker experience of the New Deal through the activity of the national 
textile strike.  In this way, her book is similar to Lizabeth Cohen’s Making a New 
Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 and Elizabeth Faue’s Community of 
Suffering & Struggle: Women, Men, and the Labor Movement in Minneapolis, 1915-
1945, both of which study the lived experience of the working class in a particular 
geographic area during the New Deal era.17  For Irons, “How southern textile workers 
mobilized in response to the New Deal is key to explaining the passion of the ‘34 
strike.”18 
      The strikes of 1934, while thoroughly documented in the historiography, 
because of their mostly triumphant results, are susceptible to hagiography. For the 
general textile strike, what my analysis shows is in addition to any weaknesses in the 
law and its enforcement, the UTW was in no place to be able to lead a strike on a 
national scale. Structurally and financially the union did not have the resources nor 
 
16 Richard Kelley, Nine Lives For Labor (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc, 1956), 65. 
17 Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939, Repr. ed. 
(Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1996). Elizabeth Faue, Community of Suffering & Struggle: Women, Men, 
and the Labor Movement in Minneapolis, 1915-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 
1991).   




staff to pull off an action of this size, but they tried anyway, and the results were 
disastrous.  While scholars like Daniel and Irons do point to the weakness of the 
UTW, the culpability for the strike’s failure has not sufficiently been explored.  In part 
what I attempt to do below is build on the work of Daniel and Irons and through the 





PRELUDE TO THE GENERAL TEXTILE STRIKE  
United Textile Workers President Thomas McMahon and Vice President 
Francis Gorman were both Rhode Islanders. Thomas McMahon was in his mid-sixties 
at the time of the strike (he was never sure if he was born in 1870 or 1868). He 
emigrated from Ireland as a boy to Rhode Island and worked in textile mills 
throughout the state. McMahon joined the Knights of Labors but after the order faded 
away he joined the UTW, three years after the union’s founding in 1901. Active in the 
union from the day he joined, he worked his way up the leadership ranks, joining the 
national executive board in 1906, eventually rising to the presidency in 1921.19  
 Francis Gorman was about a decade younger than McMahon, emigrating from 
England to Rhode Island at the age of 13.  He too worked in mills across Rhode Island 
before becoming an organizer for the UTW.  He was elected national Vice President in 
1928, assigned to the role of lead organizer for the UTW’s southern organizing 
campaign. The campaign, which the UTW under-resourced financially and 
understaffed with experienced organizers, ended in disaster, with several strikes 
crushed by the National Guard.20 Janet Irons points out Gorman was not only 
frustrated by the power of the southern mill owners, but also with the ‘indifference’ 
the UTW displayed toward organizing the southern millworkers into the union.21      
     With Gorman’s failure to organize the southern mill workers, the UTW 
languished as the depression grew deeper.  Its national membership hovered around 
15,000 and it once more teetered on the brink of economic collapse.22 But in 1932, 
 
19 Kelley, 68-69. 
20 Daniel, 37. 
21 Irons, 45-46. 




with the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the passage of the NIRA, the UTW 
was offered a lifeline. The passage of the NIRA created the National Recovery 
Administration (NRA) and gave the federal government significant oversight in core 
American industries hit hard by the Depression, including textiles.  The NIRA 
suspended antitrust laws for a period of two years, gave the NRA the ability to set 
codes of fair competition within industries, establish minimum wages, and set 
maximum hours. One of the first industries to establish a code was textiles.  
Even before Congress finalized the NIRA, the Cotton Textile Institute (CTI), 
headed by George Sloan, began drafting language for a “Code of Fair Competition.”  
The CTI began in 1926 as a voluntary association of textile manufactures attempting 
to self-regulate the industry.  The organization tried to get the industry to agree to 
voluntary production quotas to head off repeated cases of over production which 
plagued textile manufacturing for decades. By 1932, CTI was recognized as the 
official spokes group for the industry, but early in 1933, Sloan concluded without 
government intervention, the industry was too competitive to agree to voluntary self-
regulation.23 
Within a month of the signing of the NIRA, the textile industry presented to 
General Hugh Johnson, the director of the NRA, a draft code of competition.24 In a 
nod to liberals in the New Deal Administration, the code banned child labor, long a 
scourge of textile manufacturing.25 The code also, despite the industry's public 
opposition to unions and collective bargaining, included the organizing rights 
 
23 Salmond, 6, 27. 
24 Salmond 27-28 




supposedly guaranteed under Section 7(a). The code established a two-tier wage 
system for textile workers - $12/week for companies operating in the South and 
$13/week for those in the North. It also restricted production to two, forty-hour shifts 
per week and a maximum work week of forty-hours per worker. The textile industry 
code was the first approved by the NRA and both industry and labor leaders praised 
the code as a model of cooperation and some workers declared it represented their 
“industrial declaration of independence. 26 
 General Johnson named George Sloan as the government’s representative and 
chair of the textile industry code board. As Sloan began working on implementation, 
concerns surfaced because the code made no mention of the ‘stretch-out.’  For 
decades, when textile production needs increased, or if manufacturers wanted to 
squeeze more profits out of their labor, they increased the workload of mill hands.  
While numbers varied from plant-to-plant, a ‘stretch-out’ required a worker originally 
assigned to tend five looms to be assigned to ten, possibly more. Not only did the 
stretch-out make the work of tending to large, noisy, machines more stressful and 
dangerous, it meant the manufacturer would need fewer workers.  
 When the original NIRA was under consideration, South Carolina 
Congressman John Clarence Taylor, himself a former textile worker, proposed an 
amendment prohibiting the use of the stretch-out in textile manufacturing.  His 
amendment passed the House of Representatives but was removed from the final 
legislation in the conference committee with the Senate.  To placate Taylor, General 
Johnson suggested modifying the code, after implementation, to prohibit the stretch-
 




out. The modification, known as Section 15, proposed “no employee of any mill in the 
cotton textile industry shall be required to do any work in excess of 
practices...prevailing on July 1, 1933, unless such increase is submitted to an approved 
by the [new cotton textile industry committee] and by the National Recovery 
Administration.” However, Sloan prevailed upon Johnston to delay implementation of 
Section 15 until the concerns giving rise to were properly studied, and Johnson agreed. 
Janet Irons astutely observes the “debate over Section 15 contained the seeds of a 
larger conflict.”27 
 Johnson created a three-person panel to investigate the stretch-out known as 
the Cotton Textile National Industrial Relations Board (CTNIRB) and appointed an 
industry linked economist named Robert Bruere its chairperson. The other two people 
on the board were an anti-union manufacturer named Benjamin Geer from South 
Carolina and George Berry, president of the Printing Pressmen's union from 
Tennessee. Berry’s appointment was hardly a victory for textile unions - he was 
known as a conservative labor leader who had openly criticized the UTW and textile 
workers for their propensity to strike and was skeptical over stretch-out concerns.28  
 It is important to understand what General Johnson allowed to happen in the 
textile industry. He adopted the code of competition crafted by the industry and then 
appointed the head of an industry group to oversee the code’s enforcement. He created 
a three-person committee to investigate the most serious issue left unresolved by the 
code and then stacked the committee with appointees known to be sympathetic to the 
concerns of manufacturers. The UTW exerted little influence on the code or its 
 
27 Irons, 58-59. 




implementation, and even when they tried, they chose to focus wage and hour issues, 
not the stretch-out.29  
 With the implementation of the code, Sloan predicted an immediate increase in 
employment. By September of 1933, he was able to report employment levels had 
grown by 150,000. In retrospect, the increased employment seems less connected to 
the code itself than a boost in production in anticipation of the implementation of new 
taxes on raw materials, including cotton, set to take place in October of 1933 thanks to 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act.30 Described as a ‘boomlet’ by Irving Bernstein, the 
increased production was stealing “production and employment from the future.”31 
Additionally, Janet Irons contends Sloan’s committee started counting employment 
statistics months before the code was actually implemented, questioning the validity of 
attributing increased employment to the code.32 
 A rapid increase of membership in the UTW also began in 1933 after the 
adoption of the code. In early1933, the UTW was paying per capita tax to the AFL on 
only 15,000 members.33 By September 1933, membership was at 40,000 and by June 
of 1934 they counted 250,000 members.34 The largest increase was in the South, 
where local unions seemingly sprang up overnight; so much so that it was hard for the 
UTW to keep pace with demand. Daniel quotes one UTW organizer in the saying “the 
initial fear of the worker to defy his boss has been to a certain degree allayed by this 
 
29 Daniel, 22. 
30 Salmond, 30. 
31 Bernstein, 302.  
32 Irons, 74. 
33 Daniel, 38. 




very official-looking pronouncement.”35 In both South and North Carolina there were 
enough newly formed local unions that workers could form central labor councils to 
coordinate activities. The same was true in Alabama, where six separate locals were 
formed in Walker County and more than 2,600 members joined a UTW local in 
Huntsville.36 
After an initial surge in post-code employment, when the boomlet in 
production ended, demand dropped, and prices fell.  However, production costs 
enforced by the code remained intact, and as a result, employment levels increased 
more than 12% and the stretch-out returned to mills, crushing workers with the 
increased workload. As thousands of workers were let go at plants around the country, 
those that remained were expected to do in eight hours what previously took twelve.  
“The jobs are just so bad stretched out,” said one distressed worker. 37.  
 All worker complaints about job losses and the stretch were referred to the 
CTNIRB, which defended the interests of the industry and did next to nothing. Even if 
they had wanted to, the CTNIRB never had enough staff and resources to investigate 
the claims flooding into the agency. For example, of over 1700 wage and hour claims, 
only 96 were even investigated. Section 7(a) complaints about unlawful employer 
interference with union organizing, went unanswered or denied, giving employers a 
clear signal, they could ignore workers' collective bargaining rights with impunity. 
Adding insult to injury, the CTNIRB concluded its investigation of the stretch-out and 
concluded the practice was “sound in principle” if poorly implemented in some cases.  
 
35 Daniel, 42. 
36 Irons, 69. 




Rather than enact General Johnson’s proposed Section 15, Bruere’s committee 
recommended a new Section 17, creating a system of mediation for complaints of 
overwork in the stretch-out.  Of course, those complaints would be referred to the 
CTNIRB for mediation, ensuring they would die in the industry dominated 
committee.38 
 Adding to growing worker dissatisfaction with the NRA and the code, in May 
of 1934, Johnson authorized a reduction in work hours from 40 to 30 per week without 
increasing compensation making workers whole. Finally, the reticent if not docile 
UTW, spurred on by an angry and restless membership, told Johnson unless the 
decision was reversed, it would call a national strike.  “There won’t be a cotton mill 
open in the country in two weeks if this order is carried out,” said the UTW’s Francis 
Gorman.39  The industry did not take Gorman’s threat seriously.  George Sloan 
challenged how many members were paying dues to UTW, telling Bruere to request 
an audit of the UTW’s member books, saying “I’ll bet they don’t have 70,000 paid-up 
members.”  But when Bruere conducted the audit of the UTW membership numbers, 
he discovered the union had grown to over 270,000 members.40 Despite its growing 
strength, the UTW blinked.  After a two-day conference in early June, the UTW 
withdrew its strike demand in exchange for an additional representative on the 
CTNIRB.  The textile industry cheered the result, calling a great victory for the bosses 
and defeat for the meddlesome union.  To twist the knife even further, Sloan 
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convinced Johnson to add an additional management representative to the board for 
‘balance.’41 
 The union members, particularly in the south, were furious the UTW 
acquiesced so quickly. On July 16, 1934, 20,000 workers in Huntsville, Alabama, 
walked off the job without sanction from the union, shutting 24 mills.42 One worker 
told local press UTW President Thomas McMahon had killed the June strike, and 
“we’re not going to let him kill this one.”43 
 With a rank-and-file revolt on their hands, the UTW called an emergency 
executive board meeting on July 18 and decided to hold a national convention in New 
York City on August 13. At the convention, fifty separate resolutions calling for a 
national strike were introduced.  One bandaged striking Huntsville, Alabama worker, 
Monroe Addock, took the convention floor and harangued the UTW leadership saying 
“ I’ve been wounded in the head and shot in the leg, but I am willing to shed my blood 
again against the capitalists” to the roar of applause from the floor.44 Socialist Party 
Leader Norman Thomas told the assembled delegates theirs was a “fight for justice” 
and described General Johnson as “the biggest noise with the least results of any man I 
ever heard.”45  When Tom McMahon addressed the members, he told them,  “We are 
not desirous of creating chaos.  I would hate to give my consent to anything like that 
(a national strike) unless I was absolutely convinced that it was the only way out.  
There is no other way. We will say to the manufacturers: now that we know the 
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powers we possess, we will wield it, but we will wied (sic) it intelligently and 
reasonably.”46 
The convention faced other internal discord.  McMahon was forced to tell 
delegates the UTW did not have sufficient funds to send any money to any of the local 
unions, but regardless of the union’s precarious finances, the convention voted down a 
resolution to standardize dues across the country at $1 per member per month. Also, 
McMahon faced a leadership challenge from Emil Rieve of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 
Ironically, Rieve was one of the few voices in the room to urge caution on the 
proposed strike authorization resolution.  He told the crowd “we ought to bite off just 
as much as we can chew and not be swayed by the enthusiasm for a general strike.”47  
Despite Rieve’s warning, the UTW members voted overwhelmingly to strike - 561 in 
favor, 10 opposed.48 McMahon also persuaded Rieve to drop his leadership challenge 
and the convention then re-elected McMahon and his team by acclamation.49 
  The convention also voted to give the executive committee the authority to set 
the strike date but instructed them to only give 12 hours’ notice prior to the strike 
commencing.50 McMahon appointed UTW Vice President Francis Gorman, 
chairperson of the strike committee. As the convention ended, Gorman laid out the 
demands of the coming strike: Better enforcement of the NRA code, especially around 
the payment of wages; an ‘adjustment’ to the stretch out; an end to discrimination 
against union members, and a 30-hour work week for 40 hours pay.51 
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After the UTW convention in August 1934 formally sanctioned the national 
strike, Gorman appointed another Rhode Islander, Joseph Sylvia, to lead the strike 
committee in New England and Sylvia chose his home state for the base of operations.  
There is not much about Sylvia in the record, apart from a few mentions in literature 
from the TWUA-CIO, a separate union from the UTW formed during the years after 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) split from the AFL. Sylvia stayed loyal 
to the AFL after the split, and when the two unions competed for members, TWUA-
CIO literature referred to Sylvia as a “Little Caesar.”52  
Sylvia set up strike headquarters at the Labor Temple on 70 East Avenue in 
Pawtucket and began to assemble his team.53  He appointed local UTW leaders 
Elizabeth Nord and Joseph Gray to coordinate activities in the southern part of the 
state and tasked Stella Moskwa and William Clark to cover the northern part.54  Sylvia 
called for a meeting of all fifty-two Rhode Island UTW locals on Saturday, August 
25th, at the larger Eagles Hall located on Snow Street in Providence.  
While Sylvia jumped into action, local employers seemed nonplussed about the 
possibility of a strike.  When asked about the strike, employers told one local 
newspaper that they were ‘far from alarmed.”  “In fact,” one boss told a reporter, 
“many of us would be glad to close our mill and let labor leaders bring about a 
situation which they cannot control.” While some employers did not want their 
sentiments attributed to them, it is clear at this early stage that a communication 
pattern was emerging from the employer side.  Coordinated or not, employers were, or 
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at least wanted to be perceived as, unworried about the possibility of large-scale 
disruptions. “Most of our mills were operating at only 40 percent of their capacity,” an 
employer noted, adding, “and that few of them had large orders ahead.”55  
At national UTW headquarters in Washington, D.C., union officials prepared 
for the looming strike.  Speaking to a gathering of UTW leaders, Gorman gave 
instructions for how picket lines were to be conducted. He told the workers “be 
orderly, and remain orderly, always.”  Interestingly, he added, “Particularly be aware 
of communist intrigue.  Keep your ranks free of communism and communist trickery. 
Stamp it out wherever it raises its head.  Be stern about this.”56  He also said, “We will 
have to fight not only the employers and their hired thugs but the communists who are 
now trying to take advantage of this situation to promote their own philosophy.”57 
The UTW, like many of the unions affiliated with the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL), took strongly anti-communist positions in the early twentieth century. 
Cletus Daniel notes this was a specific strategy, aimed at portraying the AFL unions as 
a ‘lesser of two evils,” and thus attracting employer and public support, first when the 
International Workers of the World emerged as a competitor for the loyalties of the 
working class, and then later as the American Communist Party fought for workers’ 
sympathy and allegiance.  This strategy rarely worked, Daniel points out, but the 
UTW stuck to the play for decades.58  In her book, Common Sense Anti-Communism, 
Jennifer Luff makes clear that the UTW was one of the more aggressively anti-
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communist unions, “vigorously” fighting Communist Party affiliated unions over 
jurisdiction representing textile workers.59  In Rhode Island, the UTW was regularly 
challenged for union membership by the Communist Party affiliated National Textile 
Workers Union.  
The American Communist Party answered Gorman’s complaints against them 
in a series of articles published in The Daily Worker that were quickly converted into a 
pamphlet titled “Communists in the Textile Strike: An Answer to Gorman, Green and 
Co.” 60 The breathlessly worded pamphlet seemed particularly concerned Gorman 
would sell out the strikers at the first opportunity and allow the dispute to be arbitrated 
rather than fought out in the streets. “Don’t let Gorman, McMahon, or other A.F. of L. 
officials mislead you into accepting any treacherous arbitration scheme. Close down 
the mills and keep them closed with powerful mass picket lines.”61  
UTW leaders gathered at the union’s Washington headquarters on August 30 
to finalize their strike plans. McMahon and Gorman were joined by a delegation of 
other union leaders who travelled over from the AFL headquarters along with a gaggle 
of reporters.  The normally affable UTW leaders were reportedly agitated and tense.62  
With the crowd hovering over the telegraph machine, Gorman sent the following 
telegram: 
To all local unions, greetings. Strike of all cotton textile workers will 
begin at 11:30 O’clock, your time, Saturday night. Put all previous 
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instructions into effect.  Wool, silk, rayon and synthetic yarn 
membership stand by for further orders. Victory through solidarity.63 
 
Gorman tried to read the telegram to the group but was drowned out by the cheers of 
the union leaders in the room.  When the din subsided, Gorman issued the following 
statement to the press:  
This telegram will call half a million workers to the strike lines.  Not all 
of those are now employed.  The stretch out which adds to the machine 
load of the worker until he can bear no more, has robbed thousands of 
these their chance to work.  But every man and woman will rally to the 
strike lines and the great cotton textile industry will not move a wheel 
or thread after the hour set to stop the mills.64  
 
The telegram was sent despite last minute efforts by Lloyd Garrison, head of the 
National Labor Relations Board, to avert a strike.65  Throughout the day, Garrison 
conferred with UTW leaders and separately with George Sloan, the lead representative 
of the textile employers.  The UTW appeared willing to conference with industry 
leaders and Garrison but Sloan refused to meet with the union representatives. Despite 
his reluctance to meet, Sloan told reporters, “I suppose every citizen in America is 
hopeful the strike won’t take place.”66  
 Despite the jubilant atmosphere, confusion set in at UTW headquarters.  
Regardless of the telegram’s announcement of the strike start time, most locals were 
separately instructed to strike on Tuesday, September 4, the day after Labor Day. 




65 The Board Garrison led was called the National Labor Relations Board, but it should not be confused 
with the National Labor Relations Board created by the Wagner Act of 1935.  The website of the 






soon as the news of the strike reached them.  In Macron, Georgia, for example, 
workers at the Bibb Manufacturing plant walked off their jobs upon receipt of the 
telegram despite the threat issued by the company supervisor that “you automatically 
forfeit your positions.”67 
In Rhode Island, mill hands shared general excitement about the pending 
strike.  The meeting on August 25 called by Sylvia was filled to capacity, and not only 
did delegates from all fifty-two Rhode Island locals attend, but the workers marched in 
a parade to the meeting from the Loom Fixers Union hall in the Olneyville section of 
Providence, down Westminster Street, to Eagles Hall.  Reporters huddled outside the 
meeting, waiting for any news about the strike.  When the meeting ended, the press 
reported the Rhode Island strike committee changed the time of the start of the strike 
from September 1 (a Saturday when the mills were closed) to September 4 (the day 
after the long holiday weekend), which Sylvia flatly denied.68 Adding to the 
confusion, Sylvia was in a car accident the night of August 28.  He crashed his car 
while trying to pass another driver on his way home to Barrington, Rhode Island, 
flipping it over and hitting a telephone pole.  He broke his right wrist in the crash but 
survived.69 
 Sylvia’s organizers met again at 2:00 Saturday afternoon, September 1, to 
make final strike preparations.  Looking to clarify when the strike would take place, 
Sylvia walked back his earlier statements to the press and told reporters “we will 
picket every mill whose operatives have been called out, whether union or not” 
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starting on Tuesday, September 4.70  He also made clear the strike would be extended 
to the entire cotton industry, including workers in the worsted wool, silk, rayon, 
bleaching and dyeing, and printing industries.  Sylvia made a point of singling out the 
bleaching industry, saying that bleachery workers “have been misled in many 
instances by the employers who infer that the strike does not apply to them and are 
also included in the strike order. Workers have been advised to take their place in the 
situation in order to correct once and for all the deplorable conditions under which 
these employees have been forced to work.”71 Rhode Island AFL Vice President 
Joseph Cahir also attended the gathering and told reporters the union coalition pledged 
“complete moral and financial support of the strike.”72 It was also announced that 
UTW President McMahon would be the guest of honor at the Rhode Island Labor Day 
parade scheduled for Monday in Providence.  
 Once again, mill owners shrugged off the threat of the strike. “We shall not 
pay any attention to the strike order whatsoever. The mill will be open Tuesday 
morning as usual,” said Austin T. Levy, treasurer of the Stillwater Worsted Mill.73 
Joseph Cull, president of the Cull Silk Mill, said “in my candid opinion, the vast 
majority of silk workers don’t want this strike, and as far as Rhode Island is 
concerned, this is a sympathy strike.”74 “The mill will remain open as usual on 
Tuesday morning as far as we know.  We have not received any notice of this strike 
from our employes (sic). Some of our employes (sic), but by no means all, belong to 
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the United Textile Workers,” said Everett Salisbury, manager of the large Atlantic 
Mills in Providence.75 “If the majority want to work we will give them employment. 
We have no issue with our employees,” said R.H.L. Goddard, president of the 
Lonsdale Company.76 
 Despite the local mill owner reaction, nationally, textile operators were starting 
to ramp up their rhetoric. George Sloan told reporters: 
“We cannot accept as justified the violent procedure of the strike 
against a Government code. We contend that the New Deal meant to 
offer a guarantee of liberty to employes (sic) - a real freedom of choice 
in their relationship to their employers.  The American State cannot 
permit a majority of American men and women to be coerced into an 
organization to whose leadership they have not given their allegiance to 
whose financial support they do not desire to con- 
tribute.77  
 
Confusing things further, a Rhode Island based independent union, the 
Independent Textile Union (ITU) of Woonsocket, raised doubts about participating in 
the strike. In Working-Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City, 
1914-1960, historian Gary Gerstle reports the ITU initially voted against joining the 
strike. According to Gerstle, the ITU “did not share the grievances of workers 
elsewhere” because they had collective bargaining agreements in place that provided 
terms well above what was called for in the NIRA. 78  ITU Local President Joseph 
Schmetz told The Providence Journal that his members would only be “standing by” 
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Tuesday.79 Regardless of the status of the ITU’s collective bargaining agreements, the 
union’s reluctance to get involved, at least initially, could be understood in the context 
of their culturally different, and isolated, French-Canadian membership base. 
On Monday, September 3, 10,000 people attended the annual Providence 
Labor Day parade. Four thousand union members, led by grand marshal Joseph Cahir, 
marched through the streets of Providence, accompanied by five marching bands.  The 
largest single group of marchers were from the UTW, with 500 members in the 
parade. The parade passed a reviewing stand where UTW leaders McMahon and 
Sylvia were joined by Providence Mayor James Dunne, Newport Mayor Mortimer 
Sullivan, the Rev. Paul McElroy and several other local dignitaries. U.S. Congressman 
Francis Condon addressed the crowd, as did Rhode Island Socialist Party leader 
Joseph Coldwell.80   
The highlight of the speaking program was UTW President McMahon. He told 
the crowd that when the strike begins, do not to turn the other cheek:       
Hit back if you are hit. Fight back even if you are shot down… No man 
observes law and order more than I do, but if you’re hit, hit back as 
hard as you can. Suffer, if you have to, and fight back, for that is the 
only way to gain freedom. I have no fight with the constituted authority 
of this State, but I know President Roosevelt would rather see mill 
workers fight for the justice he demands for all labor. No power on 
earth can stop it now.  The cotton manufacturers said No, North and 
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Seemingly trying to reassure the workers the UTW was ready for action, McMahon 
concluded his speech with “In spite of hell or high water we are going through with 
this strike.”82 
 The drama of the day was not confined to the marching and the speeches. Just 
after Congressman Condon spoke, the Providence police arrested two men, Lawrence 
Spitz and Walter Petraska, who they accused of trying to disrupt the crowd.  Spitz and 
Petraska were spotted throwing “showers of communist handbills” into the crowd, 
calling for the workers to engage in a general strike in support of the textile workers.  
The leaflets accused McMahon and Gorman of getting ready to “sell out” the strikers 
and demanded that the Communist Party affiliated National Textile Workers Union be 
included in the strike preparations. It would not be the last time that Spitz was 








THE STRIKE BEGINS IN RHODE ISLAND 
After the initial confusion about its official start time, the strike in Rhode 
Island started on Tuesday, September 4. The first days of the strike passed without 
major incident in the state.  However, in other parts of the country, picket line violence 
immediately flared up; so local officials began to make preparations in case the same 
thing happened here.  Rhode Island Governor Theodore Francis Green addressed the 
state’s American Legion convention in Westerly, Rhode Island, on September 6, 
telling the Legionnaires:  
"At such a time it is easy for passions to be aroused and when passions 
are aroused acts of violence are apt to occur. It behooves all citizens, 
not only those directly involved in the strike, but those indirectly 
affected by it, and that means all of us, to do our best to remain calm 
ourselves and to persuade others to be calm even in the face of 
provocation."84 
 
The state’s Attorney General, John Hartigan, a former commander of the Legion, told 
the crowd the forces of law and order were prepared for any eventuality and that “mob 
rule would not be tolerated in this state.” 85 
 The rest of the state’s political establishment began to jockey for position on 
the issue of the strike.  On September 7, on the floor of the Rhode Island State Senate, 
Democratic Minority Leader William Troy, told his colleagues his party “should 
brook no intimidation by local or State Police, and absolutely no military oppression 
in any form.” The Majority Leader, Republican Harry T. Bodwell, responded by 
claiming Troy was trying to politicize the strike.  Bodwell told the Senate “In the crisis 
that has arisen in the textile industry in Rhode Island as a result of the strike of 
 





workers, I feel the attitude of the Democratic party should be made manifest beyond 
cavil.” Troy angrily responded to Bodwell, saying that he stood “uncompromisingly 
with the men and women who are fighting a battle for a living wage, decent treatment 
as to hours of labor and working conditions, and the recognition of their organized 
unions in the matter of bargaining with the mill owners.” He went on to say: 
“The idea of flaunting steel helmets and guns in the face of men and 
women instead of calming them may incite excitement which might 
lead to dangerous results.  These people have a right to proceed in 
peaceful surroundings and the mill barons should not be allowed to use 
either the State Police or the National Guard to intimidate them.86 
 
 By Friday, September 7, clashes between workers and authorities at Rhode 
Island mills were reported. Large groups of pickets formed from flying squadrons, 
groups of workers travelling from factory in caravans of cars and trucks, forced the 
Belmont and Manchester Mills of Woonsocket, Rhode Island, to shut down apparently 
against the wishes of both the workers and the mill owners. In Westerly, the owners of 
the George C. Moore Company successfully applied for a restraining order against 
pickets and at the Hope Mill in Scituate, Rhode Island, pickets surrounded local police 
Chief John Riley, who, fearing for his safety, drew his gun to escape from the 
picketers and immediately called the State Police for backup.  When State Police 
Captain Jonathan Harwood arrived at the Hope Mill, UTW organizer Joseph Sylvia 
was there with pickets massing around the entry of the plant, not allowing anything or 
anyone in or out of the plant.  As a result, Harwood issued an order, apparently meant 
to be carried out statewide, limiting only four union pickets per location. Catching 
Sylvia off guard with the sweeping order, he immediately went to Providence to meet 
 




with Attorney General Hartigan, who informed Sylvia that no such command had been 
authorized.87 
 Seemingly not satisfied with Hartigan’s word, Sylvia rushed to the State House 
and demanded an audience with Governor Green and tried to convince the governor 
that the UTW was keeping their ranks in order and peaceful picketing should not be 
restrained. If there was any trouble it was being brought in from out of state, likely 
Connecticut, and not authorized by the union. Sylvia told Green that he could not be 
held responsible for the actions of the flying squadrons as long as the four-picket limit 
remained in place.88 After about an hour-long conference, Governor Green’s office 
issued the following statement:  
“Ex-Senator John H. Powers, vice president of the United Textile 
Workers of America and connected with the National Labor Board, and 
Mr. Joseph Sylvia of the United Textile Workers of America, requested 
a conference this afternoon with the governor.  Attorney General 
Hartigan was also present. They conferred for over an hour on means 
for maintaining order during the strike and in especial legal, peaceful 
picketing in their rights at the same time the workers theirs. Messrs. 
Powers and Silvia had assured him that was against the policy of the 
strikers to allow anyone to come from outside the state in connection 
with picketing or to countenance the commission of any breaches of the 
peace.  The governor stated that all present had felt hopeful that good 
would result from the conference.”89 
 
The statement was not only premature, but it would also become clear the UTW 
officials did not have the ability to back-up such assurances to Governor Green.  
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     As the evening shift workers started to arrive at the Saylesville bleachery on 
Friday, September 7, they were greeted by hundreds of picketers. The Saylesville plant 
was ready for picketers to arrive because a day earlier the Saylesville plant posted a 
notice on the company bulletin board warning workers of pending pickets.  The 
announcement alerted workers the company was warned about the arrival of pickets 
and deputy sheriffs had been hired to protect the plant.  Workers could use the 
company cafeteria to eat “at rates calculated to suit the emergency.”90 
While waiting for the Friday night shift to start, picketers assembled at the 
corner of Walker and Chapel Streets, across the street from the main gate of the plant 
and began taunting the workers showing up for work.  Inside the gate, Deputy Sheriff 
Herman Paster assembled a force of about twenty men and stared down the picketers.  
It is important to note that the opposing sides were only a narrow streets’ width apart 
from each other, with the picketers controlling high ground of an embankment on the 
edge of Walker Street in front of what used to be the company clubhouse. Paster and 
his fellow deputies were not official law enforcement officers but were hired directly 
by the Saylesville plant to provide strike security. This informal army was not there to 
keep the peace, but to serve the interests of their employer.  
From the picketers’ side of the road, a group of boys began hurling rocks at the 
deputies.  One of the UTW’s picket captains, Theodore Brunelle, was injured in the 
melee, hit in the stomach by flying rocks.  UTW vice president John Powers ordered 
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the boys to stop and they did.91 In the lull, Paster stepped forward and while 
brandishing his revolver, said “You’ll get this if you don’t stop that.”  Out of the 
silence a voice from the crowd rose, shouting in response “We can take it.”  Suddenly 
another barrage of rocks flew towards the deputies, striking several.  About a half 
dozen deputies then charged the crowd, riot sticks wailing away indiscriminately.  
Newspaper reports gleefully describe the deputies ``laying about them with their sticks 
thwacking the heads and shoulders of the leaders.” Four of the crowd went down with 
injuries; Harvey Jabotte of Central Falls, James Muirhead of Saylesville, Archie 
Tremblay of Lincoln and Adelard Archambault of Providence.92 Considering the 
addresses of the victims, doubt can be raised about the UTW’s claim that any picket 
line trouble was caused by outsiders from Connecticut. It is not clear what 
relationship, if any, the rock throwing boys had to the picketers but as we shall see, the 
picketers had no relationship to the Saylesville facility. 
The pickets retreated, regrouped, and surged again towards the deputies.  
Paster ordered his men inside the plant gates to blast the pickets with a 200-pound 
pressure hose, driving them away from the gate.  In what would foreshadow the 
advance and parry of the opposing sides over the next week, once out of range of the 
hoses, the strikers reassembled and pushed forward once again; so, Paster once again 
ordered them pushed back with the water.  As the chaos worsened, local strike leader 
and UTW organizer Adelard Gingras stepped forward out of the crowd and demanded 
Paster take him to speak with the plant Superintendent Harold Reno. A truce of sorts 
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settled in as Gingras entered the plant just long enough to demand Reno shut the mill 
down, a demand bluntly rebuffed by Reno.  He told Gingras the plant would continue 
to operate “as long as the workers wished to continue working.”  Maybe Gingras knew 
what his answer was going to be and was simply buying time to let both sides cool off, 
but in any event, he returned to the picket line without any news to report other than 
the refusal to shut down.93 
Shortly after Gingras’ parlay with Reno, State Police Lt. Ernest Stenhouse 
arrived at the bleachery.  He went into the facility and conferred with plant officials.  
Press was not invited into the meeting so there is no record of what was discussed, but 
Stenhouse left the brief meeting to make his way to the mill gate where he was joined 
by a cadre of thirteen state troopers, armed with riot sticks, revolvers, steel helmets, a 
machine gun and tear gas bombs.  With this show of force, the troopers were able to 
key the picketers from pushing forward or throwing rocks.94  
The action was not over for the day, however. As the next shift ended around 
11:00, about 100 pickets were still milling about near the bleachery, using the slack 
time between confrontations to make their way back towards the plant gates.  Once 
again, the picketers were attacked by the deputy sheriffs, but this time with the State 
Police in the vanguard, swinging their riot sticks.  As the pickets retreated, strike 
leader Gingras was heard yelling at the police that they would be back Monday with 








By the end of the first week, reports were conflicting about how successful the 
strike was at shutting down the textile industry in Rhode Island.  Newspapers reported 
mill owners claimed 81 mills closed with 35,000 workers idled.  The UTW claimed 
ninety-three plants were closed with 43,000 on strike. Regardless of who was right, 
the strike was clearly impacting the operation of the mills, but without total shutdown, 
the scene was set for future confrontation. 96 
The weekend was calm in Saylesville and across Rhode Island, with only 
minor confrontations reported.  In Richmond, picketers successfully closed the Wood 
River Woolen Company mill after plant superintendent William Hopwood invited 
picketers into the plant, telling The Providence Journal that “if the workers lent a 
willing ear to the pickets, the mill should be closed, but that if a majority of the 
employees insisted they wished to work, then the pickets were to withdraw.” 
Apparently trying to outfox the superintendent and force a shutdown, the pickets 
refused the offer and Hopwood closed the plant “for the safety of employees.”97 
On Saturday, September 8, the UTW got a boost of support when the nearby 
independent union, the ITU, voted to join the strike.  Joseph Schmetz, president of the 
ITU, said on the first day of the strike that his members would be ‘standing by’ but 
now would be joining in what he called a “good will strike.”98 The immediate effect of 
the ITU joining the action was to close an additional eighteen mills. Schmetz made it 
clear his members had “no grievances against the mill owners and would be making 
no demands,” but would stand in solidarity with the striking UTW members.  As he 
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had stated just before the strike began, if the strike had shown some momentum, he 
would order his members to join the picket lines in order to increase pressure on the 
government to improve working conditions across the country.  Apparently, Schmetz 
saw the momentum he was waiting for. 99 
The violence on Friday night in Saylesville forced state officials into a 
defensive posture.  Providence Police Superintendent John Kelly issued a press release 
setting down a marker for the UTW.  Published on the front page of the Sunday 
edition of The Providence Journal, Kelley’s statement said: 
On Tuesday Sept. 4. Joseph A Sylvia, representing himself to be the 
director in New England of the strike now being conducted by the 
United Textile Workers of America, and a Mr. Clark, a local leader of 
the union, made an agreement with me, in my office at police 
headquarters that picketing by members of the United Textile Workers 
of America, which they represented, would be conducted in a peaceful, 
orderly and lawful manner and there would be no intimidation 
whatsoever of workers entering or leaving the mills, and further agreed 
to keep their picket lines properly supervised and under the control of 
leaders. 
 
However, on many occasions since that agreement was made there has 
been intimidation of workers entering or leaving mills in Providence by 
members of picket lines.  It has been obvious to the police on duty at 
these plants that these pickets were not under control and that illegal 
picketing was being carried on. 100 
 




The UTW’s Sylvia was busy over the weekend rallying his troops.  More than 
1,500 strikers and supporters gathered for a mass rally at Miller’s Pavilion in the 
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Pawtuxet Valley near several shuttered mills.  Sylvia harangued the attendees, oddly 
telling them that “You are as much at fault for the present working conditions as the 
bosses.”101 The speech seemed typical of Sylvia, who as the titular head of the strike in 
New England, seemed to have little control over the actions on the picket lines 
throughout Rhode Island and eerily foreshadowed the distance the union would 
eventual try to established between itself and what took place in Saylesville and 
elsewhere.  
Governor Green spent the weekend hunkered down with advisors at the State 
House.  Green, a Democrat, was serving his first term as governor, having won the 
office in 1932 after losing campaigns for the office in 1912, 1918, and 1930.  Born in 
1867 to one of Rhode Island’s elite families (his great-great grandfather has been a 
member of the Continental Congress), Green’s professional background was as a 
corporate lawyer.  He began his political career as a ‘reform’ candidate just after the 
turn of the century, trying to wrest political control of the levers power from the 
Republican Party which had dominated Rhode Island politics since the Civil War.  But 
with the onset of the Great Depression, Green attached himself to the Roosevelt 
campaign for President in 1932 and was swept into office in the Democratic sweep of 
that year.102   
 Organized labor was only one faction of a broad coalition of interest groups 
that supported Green’s campaign for governor in 1932.  Despite decades of political 
activity, Green only briefly served in elected office in 1907 and therefore did not have 
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the opportunity to establish a legislative record on union issues.  In the pre-New Deal 
campaign, Green’s slogan was “Humanity First,” based upon his belief that a key 
reason for the unemployment crisis of the Depression was the growing shift from 
human labor to machines in factory production.103  
      At the State House, Green met with the Attorney General, the 
Superintendent of the State Police, and the Adjutant General of the National Guard to 
discuss what preparations were underway for the strike and potential violence. He 
prepared a statement that would appear in the media on Monday, September 10, 
saying that picketing would only be “allowed if it were peaceful and without distress, 
if pickets were officially designated by their leaders and properly identified by some 
marking.”  Sensing his administration faced criticism for how it responded to the 
events in Saylesville and elsewhere, Governor Green defended himself, citing the lack 
of violence on the day after the flare up in Saylesville, and claiming it was “hard, 
therefore, to understand the few criticisms that have been directed at the State Police 
and myself.” He seemed to insinuate the fear of violence was being ginned up by 
forces ready to deploy “extreme and arbitrary measures in mere anticipation of 
violence.” He urged calm and tried to position his administration neutrally between the 
picketers and the mill owners.104 
 While Green seemed to think the worst was behind him, the owners of the 
Saylesville bleachery prepared for additional trouble. More deputy sheriffs were added 
to Herman Paster’s outfit during the evening of Sunday, September 9.  Paster told the 
press there would be no picketing allowed near the bleachery, believing his reading of 
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the riot act on Friday gave him sweeping powers of enforcement. “That’s the law,” 
Paster told The Providence Journal, “and the law will be enforced.”105 
  
 




THE STRIKE ESCALATES 
On the morning of September 10, with a small army of armed men patrolling 
the exterior of the plant, the company posted a notice to its employees reading “The 
objective which the leaders of the strikers have set for themselves is to shut this Plant 
down.  They have no hostility or grievance against the Plant or its employees but in 
order to accomplish a complete shutdown of ALL Plants, have tried to force us to stop 
all work.” Describing the situation as a “war,” bleachery management rearranged work 
schedules and secured transportation for their workers to and from the plant.106 
For most of the day it was quiet near the bleachery, but on Monday afternoon 
tensions flared once again. Two workers leaving the day shift were spotted by 
picketers as they walked out of the mill towards Central Falls.  At the corner of 
Lonsdale Avenue and Walker Street, near where the action took place on Friday night, 
a group of picketers surrounded the workers, while other pickets, now numbering in 
the hundreds, cheered them on.107 One of the picketers got in the face of the leaving 
workers and started to boo at them.  One of the departing workers punched the picket 
and a fight started.108  As the State Police rushed into the crowd in a phalanx to rescue 
the trapped workers, the pickets let loose with a hail of rocks.  Lt. Stenhouse ordered 
his men to charge the pickets, pushing back many of them with tear gas grenades. 
About forty pickets were still engaged with the workers, forcing the State Police to 
wheel around and push through them in a wedge formation.109 
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It is this incident that scholar James Findlay describes as the point of no return 
for the violence in Saylesville.110 Findlay  describes “[t]he manhandling of strikers by 
deputy sheriffs was a major factor leading to the outbreak of violence, especially at 
Saylesville, where the conflict occurred only a week after the strike began.”111  But I 
disagree with his assessment that “From the onset the strike seemed well organized in 
Rhode Island, partly because the UTW itself was relatively well organized in the 
State.”112 I read the primary source material to reveal the UTW to be less well 
organized than he claims, in part, evidenced by their inability to truly shut down the 
industry in the state . Though the numbers were in dispute between the UTW and The 
Providence Journal, by the end of the first week of the strike, at best only about half 
of the state’s cotton mills were closed.113       
Findlay also argues the violence at Saylesville escalated because of a struggle 
for power between the strikers and management. He writes, “The steady escalation of 
conflict and violence in Saylesville from September 10 to September 12 was caused 
by several factors. Among the most important was the strikers’ determination to force 
the closing of the Sayles complex.”114  But why was this mill so important?  For 
example, less than a mile away, thousands of workers for the J. & P. Coats and 
Company were still working and sent a petition to Governor Green, signed by 97.5 
percent of the workforce, asking for state protection so they could go to work 
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“unmolested.115” Other bleacheries, including the Lincoln Bleachery in the nearby 
village of Lonsdale, also did not join the strike.  Findlay does not explain why the 
Saylesville plant was so important. 
As the tear gas saturated the area, pickets retreated down Lonsdale Avenue 
covering their eyes.  Two local boys, Richard and Robert Blais, 1-year old twins, were 
evacuated from their house in the neighborhood, overcome by the fumes. Another 
local woman, Anna Hayden, collapsed from the gas exposure and was transported to 
the hospital.116  While the attack was underway, a United Electric Railway trolley was 
forced to stop in the middle of the maelstrom and its passengers were forced to 
abandon their ride and flee.117  
           On the streets of Saylesville, the situation was again escalating out of control.  
With the State Police leading the way, pushing back the bulk of the picketers, the 
deputy sheriffs, joined by twenty members of the Central Falls police force, guarded 
the main gate of the plant.  Under a new onslaught of rocks launched by picketers who 
had managed to double-back away from the State Police through the Moshassuck 
Cemetery, the deputy sheriffs opened fire on them with their riot guns -- essentially 
sawed-off shotguns.  Four workers went down - Lionel Costa of Pawtucket, Armand 
Gervais of Central Falls, and Daniel McKeon of Pawtucket were shot while Louis 
Fercki of Pawtucket suffered a fractured skull.  McKeon suffered a buckshot wound in 
his shoulder while Costa and Gervais had small arms wounds in their lower backs.118 
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While the wounded were transported two miles away to Notre Dame Hospital 
in Central Falls, police swept in to make arrests. Three men were captured: Fred 
Najjar, 30, identified at the time as a Syrian immigrant living in Pawtucket, Michael 
Barlik, 24, of nearby South Attleboro, Massachusetts, and Mathews De Sa Carvalho, 
20, also of Pawtucket.  The men were brought to the Lincoln State Police Barracks.  
The Providence Journal reported Najjar had a rock in his pants pockets when he was 
searched in the barracks and that he was “unable to account for it.”119 
A thunderstorm rolled through the area around 6 p.m., driving the crowd 
away.120  As  the streets cleared, a public works crew deployed to sweep the streets of 
leftover rocks from the encounter in front of the gate while the State Police established 
a front line at the corner of Walker Street and Lonsdale Ave.  They strung barbed wire 
across the street and mounted a machine gun in the direction of the strikers who were 
pushed through what was now a no-man’s land between the State Police and the 
Moshassuck Cemetery. Travel was banned in the area, creating the sense of a war 
zone in the neighborhood.121 
As order was restored, High Sheriff Jonathan Andrews rushed to the State 
House to meet with Governor Green.  On his way into the meeting, Andrews told The 
Providence Journal: “I think the situation will get worse out there.  My men have been 
on duty 24 hours a day since last Thursday and they are about at the end of their 
endurance. I can’t speak for the State Police, but I know they had a hard day and I 
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doubt they would be able to go through another one as hard.”122 He delivered a 
personal report to the governor, reviewing what took place on Friday night and what 
had only recently happened again in Saylesville, and recommended he dispatch the 
National Guard to the scene. His note to Governor Green read in part: “I am firmly 
convinced that the services of the militia are required and I therefore request you order 
out immediately sufficient troops to suppress such mob and to prevent the perpetration 
of further acts of violence and a possible loss of life.”123 
Governor Green spent the evening conferencing with many of the state’s 
elected leaders and in the evening addressed the state in a radio broadcast.  Again, 
trying to carve a middle path, the governor told the people of Rhode Island the 
violence was a result of a clash of two opposing forces: one was the communists, who 
in Green’s words “at least had the virtue of sincerity.” The other force was the 
“reactionaries,” who were looking for an excuse to unleash reprisals.  Interestingly, in 
a dispute with the pro-management The Providence Journal, the newspaper refused to 
print all of Green’s remarks because he would not release a full transcript.124 There 
was no evidence to support Green’s claim that “the communists” had anything to do 
with the violence in Saylesville but as we shall see, multiple players would start to lay 
the blame on them. It is also unclear who Green considered “the reactionaries.” 
William McLoughlin’s Rhode Island: A History, briefly mentions the strike and offers 
a tantalizing tidbit about how the American Legion and the Ku Klux Klan “announced 








more likely that Green, himself a former lawyer for the mill barons, was referring to 
the owners of the mills.125 And as we will see later, at least one person on the 
management team at the Saylesville bleachery was an archetypical reactionary. 
While Governor Green continued to hunker down in the State House, at 10:30 
that night, 500 picketers tried to storm the mill. Under the cover of darkness, picketers 
had a natural advantage against the well-armed police force in front of them.  The 
State Police had arranged for boxes of ammunition to be delivered to the picket lines 
and part of the arsenal included Very lights, a type of sighting flare soldiers used on 
the front lines in the trench warfare of World War 1 to spot enemy soldiers crossing no 
man’s land.  The police fired the Very lights into the sky and fired tear gas into the 
crowd as the picketers attacked the police with stones, though no further victims were 
reported.126 Adding to the mayhem, pickets started pulling fire alarms in boxes lining 
the streets of Saylesville and Central Falls.  Under the lights and gas, residents started 
to flee the neighborhood.127  
At 4:00 on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, General Dean’s troops 
began to assemble at two armories in Providence - the North Main Street Armory and 
the Cranston Street Armory. Meanwhile, Governor Green drafted legislation giving 
him the authority to increase the number of State Police officers during “actual or 
threatened rioting or serious breaches of the peace.”  Green sent the draft bill to the 
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General Assembly, along with a request for $25,000 to fund the initiative. In another 
radio broadcast later that evening, Green told the people of Rhode Island, “To make it 
clear, it is not the intention that these men shall be added to the force for the purpose 
of breaking the present strike, but only for the protection of all parties, directly or 
indirectly interested - strikers, workers, employees, and the general public.”128 
While Green maneuvered, the Saylesville bleachery braced for more attacks.  
The company posted another notice to workers, laying out their interpretation of 
events.  To the plant managers, the trouble was clearly caused by the union leaders 
who were bent on forcing the plant to close. They told their workers effective the 
following day, the hours of work would change from a three, 8-hour shift format to a 
two, 12-hour shift system.129 Later in the day new reporters began to assemble near the 
plant in set up a base camp in a shop called Brodeur’s, at 1101 Lonsdale Avenue, 
directly in between the State Police barrier at the corner of Walker and Lonsdale and 
the gates of the Moshassuck Cemetery where the picketers encamped. Sheriff 
Andrews used the same building as a command center; so, the reporters essentially 
were now embedded with the Sheriff’s troops.130 
The State Police continue to patrol the perimeter they established at the corner 
of Walker and Lonsdale Avenue and reinforced their position by stationing Corporal 
Robert Burns, a World War I veteran, with a machine gun on top of the bleachery 
roof. The Central Falls Police Department assembled under the command of Chief 
George Collette and stationed themselves with the State Police at the Walker Street 
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intersection.  Andrew’s deputies stationed themselves by the corner of Lonsdale and 
Conduit Street, in front of a company gate leading into a filtration plant. 131 
Slowly, as the afternoon progressed, the crowd in the streets of Saylesville 
began to build in size.  With the various combatants from the night before back in their 
respective corners, one can imagine each faction looking over the vacant space 
between them wondering who or what would set things in motion again today.  The 
spark was lit around 3:00 when a dump truck from the Durastone Company, located 
on the back side of the plant’s property, turned left from Higginson Avenue onto 
Lonsdale Avenue with a truck load of bricks destined for a Pawtucket City Hall 
construction project.  As the truck lumbered past the picketers and into the no man’s 
land it was abruptly stopped by the people on the street.  While the driver, Peter 
Beretta, was taken out of the truck cab and roughed up by a handful of picketers, 
others swarmed onto the truck and began to hand its cargo down to their comrades on 
the street.132 
While the police rushed to get the truck out of the way and back on the road, 
the newly armed pickets turned on the deputy sheriffs guarding the gate to the 
bleachery’s filtration plant.  Under a fusillade of brick, the deputies momentarily 
retreated, giving the picketers just enough time to crash through the gate guarding the 
filtration plant and tear down a guard shack. Chaos erupted.  The Central Falls police 
rushed to the corner of Conduit Street, leaving the State Police behind because their 
orders did not allow them to leave the Lincoln side of Saylesville. While they sprinted 
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to the scene, at 3:12 the first shots of the day were fired by the deputy sheriffs. Three 
pickets went down.  Mrs. Leonie Gussart, 73, of Pawtucket, was shot with a riot gun 
in the shins, Ernest LeGrade, 28, and Wilfred Plante, 32, both of Pawtucket, were shot 
in the legs.  An unnamed picket was clubbed in the head while another unnamed 
woman was carried away in a hysterical fit, screaming repeatedly “I’m afraid, I’m 
afraid.” The wounded were again transported to Notre Dame Hospital.133 
During the chaos, Rocky Martell, President of the Central Falls City Council 
and a resident of Lonsdale Avenue near where the battle was taking place tried his best 
to direct traffic which was, incredibly, still travelling up and down the street.  Because 
the State Police had Walker Street barricaded, the trackless trolley had to travel farther 
down Lonsdale Avenue than usual on temporary wires.  At one point in the 
commotion a car jumped the sidewalk and nearly crushed a group of young people 
who were standing on the sidewalk watching the action. Within minutes the police and 
sheriffs started to drive the crowd back towards the cemetery gates.134  
As the attack unfolded, Sheriff Andrews, from his post inside Brodeur’s store, 
called Governor Green and asked for help from the militia.  The reporters in the room 
overheard a heated conversation with the governor and reported Andrews saying, 
“You want to wait until something happens.  I want to protect the people who want to 
go to work,” clearly indicated which side of the conflict his allegiances lay. When 
Andrews hung up, he turned to the press corps and said “Well, it’s on his shoulders if 
they all get killed out there.”  After the assault at Conduit Street, Andrews was back 
on the phone to Governor Green: “It’s on your head, governor, if you don’t send those 
 





troops to Saylesville.  They’ve broken down the gate and I don’t know what they are 
going to do next.” On this word, Governor Green called General Dean and gave him 
the order to deploy.135 
There were close to 3,000 people on the streets of Saylesville at this point.  An 
aid to Governor Green rushed to Sheriff Andrews location to tell him the Guard was 
on the way and to contact the governor immediately. When Andrews phoned the 
governor, he was informed that he was being relieved from duty.136  Perhaps because 
he saw the huge crowd on the street gear up for action or perhaps because in his 
opinion he did not report to the governor but instead reported to his paymasters at the 
Saylesville bleachery, Andrews told the governor’s aid that he would “take that under 
advisement.”  He then called Robert B. Dresser, the attorney for the factory, and told 
him that the militia was on the way. Dresser instructed the company to tell the sheriffs 
to return to the barracks inside the factory gates until a decision was made, by the 
company, if they wanted the sheriffs to remain on duty.137 
While Andrews’ deputy sheriffs retreated, the militia mustered to bugle calls 
and boarded trucks to head to Saylesville.  One hundred men of the 103rd Field 
Artillery, commanded by Col. Harold Baker, were given a police escort out of 
Providence for the five-mile drive to Saylesville.  A second detail of 150 soldiers from 
the 243rd Coast Artillery under the command of Col. John Collins left the nearby 
Cranston Street Armory.  Among the soldiers were several recent graduates of Brown 








service of their graduates, who provided both aerial and other surveillance for the 
militia.138 
  The troops arrived in Saylesville at 4:10 and unloaded from their trucks in 
relative silence.  However, as the last truck pulled into the area the crowd started to 
boo the soldiers and as they finished deploying the rocks started to fly.  For five 
minutes, the Guard withstood the barrage of stones while they formed up in orderly 
lines of ten men each.  Suddenly, an officer’s whistle blew, and the Guardsmen 
attacked the crowd, indiscriminately swinging riot clubs at whomever was in their 
way.139 
People fled down side streets and through the backyards of the neighborhood. 
The Providence Journal described the attack on the pickets gleefully: “In a few cases 
their pursuers were fleeter. Down came the clubs. Girls and women scurried for cover, 
shrieking as though they were departing for all time, but soon quiet prevailed.”140  
After the crowd retreated to safety, they regrouped and pushed back against the Guard.  
For the rest of the afternoon this pattern of assault and counter assault continued. In 
one push by the soldiers, they shot a volley of rifle fire over the heads of the pickets, 
which forced them back to the Dexter Street intersection. Incredibly, during the fray, 
the soldiers dropped a box of tear gas bombs that was picked up by the pickets.  The 
people promptly began to throw the bombs back at the Guard itself, pushing them 
back to the Walker Street barricade.  Flummoxed, the Guard switched to nausea gas 
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and made another push.  The entire neighborhood was poisoned with the gas, sending 
the Blais twins to the hospital for a second day in a row.141 
At around 6:00 that evening, the Guard, outmatched on the street, called for 
reinforcements.  All Guardsmen across the state were ordered to muster at their home 
armories and await orders. General Dean would not comment about how many 
soldiers he had at his disposal, but the reports were the entire Guard comprised 550 
soldiers and 50 officers.  Since he was himself in the field, General Dean had to 
improvise in how his order was to be conveyed to his men.   In Newport, Company F 
of the 118th Engineers, was called to duty with two rounds of nine blows of the fire 
alarm horn. Other troops mustered after hearing a radio broadcast calling them to duty, 
which The Providence Journal reported was 80% effective. 142 
At 7:00, the reinforcements arrived.  The 153rd Hospital Company set up a 
field station behind the factory gates under the command of Major Earle Brennan to 
treat the wounded militiamen. As the militia moved to surround the entire bleachery 
area the pickets regrouped on their side of no man’s land.  As daylight waned, the 
parish priest from St. Mathieu’s Church at the corner of Dexter and Lonsdale Streets 
pleaded with Central Falls Police Chief George Collette to get the picketers off the 
church grounds. Collette was refused help from the Guard in this task, so with his 
twenty-two men he tried to get the pickets to withdraw from the church property.  He 
was aided by Theodore Brunelle from the UTW.  Brunelle jumped atop a car and 
pleaded with the crowd to withdraw.143 
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  Whether the crowd was following the orders of Collette and Brunelle, or 
whether they simply took a dinner break, the pickets did not launch another major 
attack until just before 10:00 that night when they attacked the soldiers at three points.  
One attack happened directly in front of the Moshassuck Cemetery, where some 
soldiers were stationed.  Another at the corner of Lonsdale and Liberty Streets, where 
the Sheriffs patrolled, guarding the area where the pickets earlier torn down the gate. 
The third was at the State Police barricade at Walker and Lonsdale.  Learning from 
their better armed adversaries, the pickets fired Roman candles into the air to acting 
improvised Very lights.  At least one soldier, Captain John C. Ball, was injured 
significantly enough in the battle in the cemetery with a head wound that he had to be 
transported to the field hospital for treatment.144 
While all this was going on, Joseph Sylvia from the UTW finally appeared on 
the picket line in Saylesville. He drove his car to the rear side of the militia lines and 
asked to speak with General Dean.  After keeping him waiting for 30 minutes, the 
General agreed to speak with Sylvia inside the factory gates in the Guard’s makeshift 
barracks.  While Dean and Sylvia were cloistered in the barracks for over an hour, the 
battle intensified on the street. The soldiers and police, caught off guard by the 
ferocity of the attack, again flooded the area with gas.  The Guard could no longer stop 
the crowd from advancing with the gas bombs, so an order was dispatched back to the 
armory for an order of more ammunition. Sylvia and Dean finished their conference 
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without comment to the press.  Sylvia left the picket line area and Dean resumed his 
position at the command post.145 
The battle continued for several more hours.  At 12:30 in the morning, the 
pickets were finally able to knock out the last remaining streetlight at the corner of 
Tucker Street, casting the whole battle zone into complete darkness.  With extra cover, 
the pickets intensified their attack.  This time, General Dean himself led the 
Guardsmen’s counter offensive, driving the pickets back again into the grounds of the 
cemetery.  At 1:15, the 243rd Coast Artillery unit deployed three anti-aircraft lights, 
adding to the warfare like atmosphere in the streets. At 2:00, a cohort of 300 pickets, 
including several “young girls and youths” marched down Lonsdale Avenue toward 
the line of the Guardsmen.  The pickets taunted the soldiers, daring them to shoot.  
One woman, it was reported, stood in front of the crowd, trying to provoke the armed 
militia men, daring them to shoot her where she stood. In a notable shift, newspaper 
reports described the hostile crowd as hurling “communist rhetoric” at the soldiers, 
cursing the government while the soldiers “stood silent under epithets and jeers.”146  
After almost 12 hours of continuous fighting, the pickets started to slip away, but not 
before removing all the manhole covers on Liberty Street and opening up the fire 
hydrants, flooding the underground wire channels.  By 3:00 in the morning the streets 
were empty, and what The Pawtucket Times was already referring to as “The Battle of 








During the day, at least fifty pickets were injured, including three who were 
shot. Among the injured was Peter Szeliga, a 19-year-old Central Falls man who was 
treated at Notre Dame Hospital for first degree burns on his hand after he picked up an 
unexploded gas bomb and it blew up in his hand.  Seven Guardsmen were injured, 
including Private Chester Bromley of the 103rd Field Artillery, who suffered powder 
burns on his hand when he picked up one of the Guard’s lost gas bombs the pickets 
had commandeered for their defense.  Seven people were arrested, all of whom lived 
in the general vicinity of the strike area but none of whom worked at the Saylesville 
plant. Newspaper reports claim that during the entire day, nearly the entire workforce 
of the bleachery reported to work.148 
With the situation on the streets out of control, Governor Green made another 
radio broadcast to the people of Rhode Island.  As Green’s biographer Erwin L. 
Levine emphasizes in Theodore Francis Green, the Rhode Island Years, the governor 
desperately wanted to keep order while not being accused of breaking the strike.149 
Green’s predecessor, Emery San Souci, lost his bid for re-election after ordering the 
National Guard to attack strikers during the 1922 textile strike. Governor Green told 
his constituents, “order must be restored - not in the interest of the plant, not in the 
interest of any particular group, but in the interest of the safety of the state of Rhode 
Island.”  The day before Green blamed the violence on both communists and 
reactionaries, this time he placed the blame on the sheriffs.  He told the people: 
What a difference between the record of the State Police in this 
emergency and the record of the deputy sheriffs; the contrast between 
doing things the right way and doing things the wrong way.  The State 
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Police have not fired a shot.  Everyone one of the persons - men and 
women- were shot down by the deputy sheriffs - not due to the 
individual man as much as to the system- men untrained and unsuited 
for this delicate work, armed with guns, who in many cases pushes into 
the crowd with rough words cause [sic] intentional provocation.150 
 
The governor also expressed exasperation with Sheriff Andrews. After ordering him 
and his men to stand down, Andrews told him he had to consult with mill ownership 
before complying with the order.  “He meant, I suppose,” Governor Green said, “Mr. 
Robert B. Dresser.  In other words, the order of the governor in this emergency is 
subject to the veto of Mr. Robert B. Dresser.”151 
Dresser, the lawyer for the bleachery, was the archetypal reactionary in 
Green’s now abandoned “both sides” argument. Throughout the strike he served as 
spokesperson for the Sayles Finishing Plant and, as Green’s comments indicate, 
directed the actions of Sheriff Andrews and his deputies.  Dresser was a long-time 
conservative activist, later becoming a member of the John Birch Society, and 
regularly publishing right-wing broadsides in conservative and libertarian magazines 
like The Freeman and The Committee for Constitutional Government.152 In the late 
1950’s and early 1960’s he led the opposition in Rhode Island against laws aimed at 
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95 in 1976, the New York Times wrote of him, “He believed the Federal Government 
was destroying the private enterprise system through taxation.”154  
As James Findlay confirms in his essay, eyewitness reports in the press clearly 
indicate the deputy sheriffs were provoking the violence from the pickets.  Former 
State Representative Arthur Costigan who lived in the neighborhood told reporters he 
would be filing a formal protest over the ‘provocative methods’ used by the sheriffs, 
including pointing their guns at pickets without reason.  At another point in the melee 
a deputy sheriff threw a tear gas bomb through the window of Brodeur’s store, 
injuring Providence Journal photographer George Goodreau and sending the rest of 
the press corps scrambling for cover.155 But simply transferring command of the 
streets from the sheriffs to the militia did little to quell the uprising.  
The deputy sheriffs were gone from the streets of Saylesville on the morning of 
September 12.  In their place were fresh National Guard troops who moved 
immediately to assert their presence.  At 6:00 in the morning, with hundreds of pickets 
assembled on the Central Falls side of Lonsdale Avenue, next to St. Mathieu's Church, 
the Guard issued an order to disperse.  When the pickets refused to move, the Guard 
fired their rifles over the heads of the crowd.  General Dean was later asked if he had 
given orders to his men to “shoot to kill?”  “No,” he said, but ominously added “the 
bullets just missed.”156  After the shooting, Col. Herbert Barker of the 103rd led thirty-
two of his men onto the grounds of Moshassuck Cemetery, with bayonets mounted on 
their rifles, to track down a group of suspected ring leaders of the pickets who had fled 
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for protection from the gunshots behind gravestones.  A volley of rifle fire, some 
ripping through headstones, forced the hiding pickets out from cover and back onto 
the street, where they were apprehended by the guardsmen.  Ten people, including 16-
year-old Rita Brouilette of Central Falls, were marched single file by the soldier to an 
awaiting truck that transported them to the Lincoln police station.157 
Shortly before 7:00, seven more truckloads of troops arrived on the scene.  The 
soldiers were detailed to clean up the considerable debris off Lonsdale Ave from the 
battle the day before.  As the soldiers began to station themselves at their posts, 
pickets jeered at them, telling them to “go home and do the housekeeping” and “you’d 
shoot your own mother.” The crowd continued to swell, as did the number of troops, 
now reported to be a force of 1,200 strong.  At 10:00, General Dean ordered 
sharpshooters stationed at the gates of Moshassuck Cemetery sending a clear message 
they were preparing for a serious confrontation and not to be trifled with.158  
With the troops massing on the street, the Saylesville community began to 
show signs of battle fatigue.  St. Mathieu’s parochial school and the West Side 
grammar school across the street from St. Mathieu's Church released their pupils early 
with instructions to go home.  Rev. Peter Hanley of nearby Holy Trinity Church told 
his parochial school pupils they too would be released early. But if the schools had 
hoped releasing the students would get them to safety from what they feared the Guard 
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was gearing up for, they were mistaken.  The students, at least some of the older ones, 
appear to have joined the crowd of pickets, swelling their numbers even further.159 
While the schools were shutting down, General Dean and his men dug in.  
Around 11:00 in the morning, the 118th Engineering Company dug holes in the street 
and erected wooden posts to connect barbed wire in what Harold Fletcher, a National 
Guardsman at the time of the troubles, described as a French highwire double apron, 
affectionately known as a ‘gooseberry.160 But while the troops were digging in, 
carloads of new picketers began to arrive.  However, unlike the mass of people at the 
other end of Lonsdale Avenue, these pickets seemed organized.  The 140 people were 
all wearing white armbands and collected themselves in teams of twenty.  They 
approached the Guard barricade and asked to be let through so they could picket in 
front of the factory gate. However, Col. Harold Baker refused them safe passage.161 
A man stood out from the crowd and told Col. Baker his name was William 
Clark of Providence and that he was an organizer for the UTW. According to Clark, he 
and his official pickets had been authorized under an agreement with the governor and 
the union to allow groups of 20 pickets, duly recognizable by their white armbands, to 
picket during daylight hours.  Baker still refused passage.  Within minutes, Joseph 
Sylvia arrived on the scene and confirmed Clarke’s story about a deal being made with 
Governor Green.  Baker still refused passage to the group.162 This group of authorized 
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union pickets was the first sign of organized activity by the UTW since Friday 
evening. 
While the UTW tangled with Baker and the Guard, Governor Green sought to 
gain control of the political situation.  That morning he delivered a letter to Sheriff 
Andrews asking for the names of all the men who had served as deputy sheriffs at the 
Saylesville plant.  Apparently reacting to the reports of the misadventures of the armed 
deputies, Governor Green told Andrews to “Consider this an order, not a request.”163  
The governor met again with General Dean, who apprised him of the situation.  While 
they were meeting, reports came to the State House that the crowd was growing again 
in Saylesville.   Dean rushed back to the scene and the governor issued the following 
statement:  
The situation in Saylesville is still serious.  General Dean and I have 
been conferring in my office and were interrupted by news that the mob 
was collecting again and he immediately left to take command there.  
Order must be reestablished in the interest of all - the workers, the mill 
owners and you, the people of the state.  Please try to realize this; 
realize also that you have a duty to perform.  The large number of 
people not connected with the strike who congregated about the 
Saylesville bleachery yesterday and last night added to the disorder and 
made it difficult for the National Guard to do their work properly.  
Practically all, if not all, of the persons arrested proved to be neither 
former workers of the mill nor strikers; they were curiosity seekers or 
hoodlums. I beg of you all to keep away from that neighborhood.  No 
one should go there unless absolutely obliged to do so. Every curiosity 
seeker adds to the confusion.  He not only runs the risk of injury and 
possible loss of life, if shots are to be fired, but also, he adds to the 
danger of others.  Let everyone help in this emergency and one way of 
helping is by keeping away from places of disorder, keep away 
yourself, and urge everyone else to keep away.  I ask for your help and 








As General Dean left the State House, he issued an ominous statement to the 
assembled press:  
My men have taken severe punishment for 14 hours.  They have been 
the target for rocks of all kinds and sizes, but from now on there will be 
no more rock throwing.  We are not going to tolerate any further 
hurling of such things.  The moment rock throwing starts we will act 
much differently than we have up to this point.165 
  
 As in the previous days there was a midday lull in the action on the streets 
before, midway through the afternoon, the opposing sides geared up for battle. The 
soldiers began to spread more barbed wire across Lonsdale Ave at the corner of 
Liberty street, essentially cutting the ‘no man’s land’ between the Guard’s line and the 
picketers’ line in half.166 As the Guardsmen locked themselves into position, about 
500 pickets marched up the streets towards them. As the hot summer sun beat down 
on the combatants, rocks started to fly at the soldiers.  The pickets began to improvise 
with their weapons, filling bottles with nails and screws, and even stringing a rubber 
inner tube from a car tire in between two tree limbs at the corner of Moshassuck 
cemetery to use as a giant slingshot.167  As the barrage opened up, one guardsman, 
William Castaldi, was hit in the head with a flowerpot flung from the slingshot.168 
 As promised by General Dean, the Guardsmen showed no tolerance for the 
attack.  Four soldiers armed with rifles deployed to the corner of the barbed wire post 
and the order to fire was given.  The soldiers fired indiscriminately into the crowd, 
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which had now grown to nearly 5,000 people. The crowd panicked and ran for cover 
into the cemetery, breaking off pieces of headstones to fling back at the pursuing 
Guardsmen. Two teenage boys ducked for cover behind two of the gravestones close 
to the street and raised handkerchiefs as white flags, and they were dragged to safety 
behind the soldiers’ line.  After the volley of shots, the guard used “gas guns” to shoot 
tear and nausea gas at the pickets, blanketing the entire area again with noxious fumes. 
The crowd retreated as best they could back to the Central Falls side of Lonsdale 
Avenue, picking up their wounded along the way.169 
 Three people were shot. Nicholas Gravello, 22, of Pawtucket, was shot through 
the right arm, Charles Gorcynski, 18, of Central Falls, was shot in the stomach and 
William Blackwood, 44, of Pawtucket, was shot in the head.  Unlike the previous 
shooting victims, who had been hit with buck shot from deputy sheriffs, these men 
were hit with rifle fire. The wounded were rushed to Notre Dame Hospital where it 
was clear that Gorcynski and Blackwood were in grave condition.  Father St. Goddard 
of Notre Dame Church performed the Last Rights on Gorcynski while Blackwood’s 
mother collapsed when she arrived at the hospital discovering her son was shot. 
Witnesses told reporters neither man was directly connected to the strike. Gorcynski 
was employed at another nearby mill and was the sole breadwinner for his family, 
including eight brothers and sisters.  Blackwood, an unemployed weaver, had gone to 
the picket line looking for his 18-year-old son who was reportedly involved in the 
action.170 
 





As reports started to filter back to the lines about the fate of the wounded, 
General Dean told reporters that his “men went out with the intention of shooting 
anybody who did not obey their orders.”171 With open warfare in the streets, the 
community leaders in the area demanded an end to hostilities.  Robert Briden, 
president of the Board of Trustees of Moshassuck cemetery fired off a terse telegram 
to Governor Green demanding his cemetery be protected. The message read: 
The Board of Trustees of Moshassuck Cemetery demand protection for 
the graves of our loved ones who are interred in this sacred ground. We 
appeal to you as governor to prevent the desecration that has taken 
place during the past few days.172 
 
The Pawtucket Common (i.e., City) Council was more demanding of Green.  They  
 
met in emergency session and passed the following resolution: 
 
Whereas the Pawtucket Common Council interested in the welfare of 
the citizens of this city and the peace of this city and neighboring 
communities, urge the governor to use whatever power he may have 
under the Constitution and laws to close mills in areas where bloodshed 
is like to occur and to proceed with qualified and representative 
officials on both sides of this controversy to bring about peace, law, 
and order in the State of Rhode Island.173  
 
The Central Falls Common Council sent a similar resolution with the same demand – 
 
shut down the Saylesville plant to avoid future bloodshed.174  
 
 With Saylesville now fully embroiled in virtual hand-to-hand combat, the 
UTW leaders scrambled about what to do next.  Sylvia demanded another audience 
with Governor Green and General Dean returned from the front for the meeting.  
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There is no record of what was said in their conference, but as the rioting intensified in 
Saylesville, Governor Green issued an order to be read on the streets.  The 
responsibility fell to Central Falls Police Lt. Joseph Chaput, who read the following 
statement from the governor to the crowd assembled at Dexter and Lonsdale: 
I do hereby charge and command all people who are unlawfully, 
riotously or tumultuously assembled anywhere in this State that they 
immediately disperse and peaceably depart to their habitations, under 
penalties inflicted by the laws of this state.175 
 
The crowds did not disperse as ordered. With thousands of people still in the streets, 
Governor Green once again took to the radio waves to plea for calm.  At 8:15 that 
evening, Green told the people of Rhode Island:  
Believing that the bad feeling between the National Guard and the 
strikers was in reality the result of a misunderstanding, I called a 
conference this afternoon between high military officers and strike 
leaders, and I am glad beyond words to say that the conference was 
productive of good results and adjourned with an agreement with 
regard to picketing which I trust may prove to be effective.  Picketing 
has been a great source of disagreement and violence.176 
 
He also told the people of Rhode Island, that “I want to emphasize the point that this is  
 
not an armistice between opposing forces.” 
 
 The pickets on the streets of Saylesville certainly did not recognize the 
situation for an armistice, as they continued to harass the soldiers with rocks and other 
projectiles. Shortly after the governor started his radio speech, the soldiers again 
opened fire on the crowd.  One boy, Fernand LaBreche, 17, of Central Falls, was shot 
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near the heart.  As LaBreche lay bleeding on the ground, a soldier came running up to 
the line shouting to his comrades “Hold your fire, and agreement has been made 
between the governor and other officials! There will be no more firing.” 177  This did 
little to assuage the anger of the crowd.  Central Falls patrolman Alfred Viau was hit 
in the head with a rock and transported unconscious to Notre Dame Hospital. By 10:00 
there were still thousands of people on the streets.178 
 Around 11:00, anti-aircraft lights were deployed in the yard of the plant to give 
the soldiers a clearer picture of the battlefield.  Seeking to establish cover, the pickets 
put out the lights of any car that was traveling through the area.  One driver who 
refused to turn out his lights had his car seized and overturned by the pickets.179  
Whether intentional or not, when Sylvia finally returned to the scene before midnight, 
his car was bombarded with rocks and he was hit in the head. Sylvia, however, 
recovered enough to issue the following statement:  
I feel confident that if the United Textile Workers of America are not 
victims again of broken promises that violence and disorder will not 
reign again in Saylesville.  Tonight, we assured Governor Green and 
Adjt. General Dean that we will be willing to cooperate with their 
military organization in keeping peace in the strike. This is the same 
assurance that we gave Commanding Officer Dean last night when he 
agreed to allow us to have pickets in five blocks of 20 under designated 
captains properly identified, but this gentlemen’s agreement was 
broken and as a result three are critically wounded and one is seriously 
wounded.  We sent one squad of ten pickets at 10 AM today to 
determine the seriousness of ADJT. General Dean’s agreement. We did 
not send the hundred, but we found drawn clubs and rifles in the hands 
of the guardsmen.  Although properly designated not a union striker 
was allowed inside the rope lines that preceded the barbed wire 
barricades. Then clubs were wielded, tear gas was hurled and shots 
 






were fired, the result of a broken agreement. If our pickets could do 
their part there would be no bloodshed. School children would not have 
been the object of stones or bullets or clubs if we had been allowed to 
follow out the plan which we agreed to try at the suggestion of Adjutant 
Dean.180 
 
            The people of Saylesville woke up the news that Charles Gorcynski 
died from his wounds.  There were no picketers anywhere to be found and the 
National Guard troops took advantage of their absence to extend their 
fortifications further down Lonsdale Avenue in both directions, erecting 
barbed wire gateways on either end.  Residents had to show identification to 
come or go through the gates.  Seventeen men who had been arrested by the 
Guard over the last twenty-four hours were turned over to the Central Falls 
police and transported to the 11th District Court in front of Judge Charles Risk.  
Three of the men plead guilty to minor charges, two of whom were sentenced 
to thirty days in jail, and one released after paying a fine.  The other fourteen 
pleaded innocent to the more serious charge of “riotous assembly.” Their 
collective bond was set at $24,200.  A few paid their portion of the bond, most 
did not, and were held over for trial scheduled for September 25.181 
 The UTW organizers gathered for a morning meeting at the Labor Temple to 
assess the situation. Adelard Gingras told reporters after the meeting the UTW had 
appointed selected men to work with the Central Falls police to identify any radical 
agitators who were in the area looking to cause trouble.  Despite the increased Guard 
fortifications and the union’s willingness to work with the police, a crowd of about 
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500 people gathered in Quinn Square, near St. Mathieu’s church, around 3:00.  After 
being ordered to leave, police arrested three men from Providence who refused to 
move.  The show of force and the arrests dissuaded the crowd from any further action 
and other than a small group of people approaching the Liberty Street guard gate in the 
evening, all remained quiet.182 
 At 10:30 that morning, Governor Green received a call from President 
Roosevelt.  They discussed the situation in Rhode Island and the possible deployment 
of federal troops to forestall any more violence.  Governor Green described the call to 
reporters:  
President Roosevelt has just called me up, and I had a long and most 
satisfying talk with him.  I told him the length of the situation here, and 
he showed remarkable knowledge of Rhode Island conditions. He said 
he was getting in touch with Washington to have all information ready 
and all preparations made to respond to any call for federal troops the 
state might formally make in this emergency.  He ended by saying that 
he was heartily in back of me and would support me to the limit.183 
 
Roosevelt’s office also issued a statement after the call, saying: “The President is in 
complete and constant touch with the Rhode Island situation.  It is, of course, hoped 
that disorders caused by irresponsible and disorderly individuals will terminate before 
nightfall.”184 After the call between the governor and the president it was reported 
General Douglas MacArthur was beginning preparations to send federal troops to the 
strike area and troop movements were noted across New England.  Five hundred 
soldiers of the 13th Infantry and the 66th Tank division were ordered to cancel 
scheduled maneuvers and report immediately to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, an 
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hour’s drive from Saylesville. Secretary of War George Dern was also reportedly on 
his way to Rhode Island to arrive before President Roosevelt, who was scheduled to be 
in Newport that weekend for an annual yacht race.185 
 Green also spoke that morning with Saylesville Finishing Plant lawyer Robert 
B. Dresser.  After the phone call, the Board of Directors for the Saylesville plant met 
and voted to close the plant effective at 5:00 that evening.  Later in the day, Dresser 
made public a carefully worded letter to the press he had sent Green to confirm the 
closing.  It read in part: 
Although we have had no strike, and have no dispute with our own 
employees, who urgently need the employment which we are willing 
and able to afford them if given protection in continued operation, 
nevertheless, the board of directors conceives it as a duty in common 
with that of all good citizens to cooperate to the fullest extent with you 
as commander-in-chief of the state military force and as governor of the 
State in meeting the crisis which you state has arisen.  
 
Accordingly, we beg to state that we are complying with your request 
and that our plant at Saylesville will be closed at 5 O’clock this 
afternoon, when the day shift ends.186 
 
Inside the plant, the company posted two separate notices to workers, telling them that 
as the Commander and Chief of the State, the governor had ordered the plant 
closed.187 
As the drama subsided on the streets of Saylesville, it was just beginning at the 
State House. Governor Green, concerned about the potential for continued violence, 








sweeping package of bills he claimed would allow him to take control of the situation. 
He was aware although the use of federal troops was offered, it would take time for 
those troops to mobilize and transport to Rhode Island. Therefore, he submitted 
emergency legislation to the General Assembly doing four things:  allocate an 
additional $100,000 to the State Police to increase their ranks, allocate an additional 
$100,000 to the National Guard so that they could deploy 1000 veterans immediately 
to strike areas, allow the Governor to close any mills in the state by executive order, 
and finally, declare a state of insurrection existed, empowering the governor to 
formally request the federal troops.188   
 The governor prepared a statement for the members of the General Assembly 
outlining his reasons for calling the special session.  He wrote to them saying: 
I have called you together here today, although you were to have met 
tomorrow, because of a crisis in the affairs of State.  We are face to 
face now, not with a textile strike, but a communist uprising. What 
started as local conflicts between employers and striking workers over 
the question of picketing has grown and spread to other localities and 
includes a large number of persons with no interest whatsoever in the 
strike but seeking merely to create disorder, and some of them with the 
deliberate plan to upset our established government. 189 
 
He reviewed what actions his administration had taken so far to suppress this 
“communist uprising” including replacing the deputy sheriffs with the State Police and 
then supporting the State Police with the militia.  He praised the actions of both, but 
also acknowledged that thus far these steps had “proved inadequate” to the situation.  
Therefore: 
Due to the fact that some time will be required to select and place on 
active duty additional members of the State Police and in order that 
increased protection of our people and property by tonight, I have 
 





prepared for your consideration and passage legislation permitting this 
state to take advantage of the provisions of the constitution of the 
United States by calling for aid from the armed forces of the Federal 
Government.190 
 
The General Assembly was divided between a House of Representatives 
controlled by Democrats and a Senate controlled by Republicans. Additionally, the 
House majority was divided into two factions: one supporting fellow Democrat Green, 
and another controlled by Pawtucket Democratic Party boss, and rival of Green, 
Thomas McCoy.  McCoy and Green spent years jousting for control of the Party and 
at this stage of Green’s first term as governor, it was not clear who had the upper 
hand.191 
 The special session started off in a spirit of bipartisanship, with the leaders in 
both chambers agreeing to waive procedural rules so the governor’s proposals could 
be given speedy consideration.  But not long after the session began, Governor 
Green’s proposals hit a snag.  The Democratic Party caucus in the House, even after 
the governor personally addressed them, called for tabling the measure calling for 
federal troops and declaring a state of insurrection.  They did support his other calls 
for more money for the State Police and National Guard and giving him the authority 
to close the mills.192  
 While initially signaling he would be willing to support the governor’s 
proposals, after a party caucus in the Senate, Republican Senate Majority Leader 
Bodwell told the governor he would not be able to support the measure giving the 
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governor the authority to close any mills.  Bodwell told the governor passing such a 
bill would make Green a ‘tool of labor.’193 When the Senate convened later in the day, 
Bodwell moved to divide the legislation into two separate measures - one concerning 
the additional funds for the State Police and National Guard, the other addressing the 
power to close the mills (it is unclear if the Senate ever took up the proposal to declare 
a state of insurrection). Democratic Minority Leader Senator William Troy, who 
verbally sparred with Bodwell at the outset of the strike, took to the floor of the Senate 
and declared that Bodwell had broken his word to the governor on the measures.  
Bodwell proceeded anyway with the motion to divide the question, which was 
authorized by the majority.  He then took to the floor to explain his support for the 
measure for additional funds. He said:  
 Flames of communism and all that goes under the red banner threaten 
the safety of our people and the security of their homes. An extreme 
emergency exists. In such an emergency there is only one thing for 
patriotic Americans to do, and that is to join wholeheartedly, genuinely 
and completely in aiding the Chief Executive, in seeing that he is given 
the tools required - it is not a question of what kind they should be - so 
that the safety of our people and homes may be protected.194 
 
Minority leader Troy implored his colleagues to pass both measures to no 
avail. When the vote was taken on the divided measure the provision to support the 
additional funding and manpower was approved unanimously but was 25-15, 
following party lines, against the mill closing bill.  The Rhode Island General 
Assembly does not operate with a conference committee structure like the United 
State Congress. Instead, for a bill to become law, it must first pass in both chambers, 







However, the House had already adjourned for the day, meaning the measures would 
need to wait until the next day, Friday, for consideration. 195 
 Although the House was adjourned, the Democratic Party again caucused 
privately to decide what to do next on.  The next day, when the House convened 
shortly after 10:00 in the morning, the plan hatched in the caucus unfolded.  House 
Majority Leader Representative Edmund Flynn took to the floor and assigned the bill 
to increase funding for the State Police and the National Guard to the House Finance 
committee, as is customary protocol. However, in a move catching Governor Green by 
surprise, Flynn then made a motion to adjourn.  The motion was seconded by 
Representative Patrick McAughey, an ally of the McCoy block in the House.  While 
members of the House aligned with the governor protested the move, the vote to 
adjournment was approved, effectively killing all of Green’s proposals.  With no 
legislation before them, the Senate followed the House and adjourned shortly after 
1:30 that afternoon.196 
 A chastened Governor Green called the press to his office in the State House 
and issued the following statement:  
I am very much disappointed that the House Finance Committee did 
not report the bill passed by the Senate which would have increased the 
State Police appropriation during this emergency. I was informed 
yesterday that certain influences in the House, which continuously have 
hindered legislation which I have sponsored killed this measure. 
Certain members of the House have informed me just what the motives 
of this group are. When the National Guard is withdrawn from the 
strike areas, which I hope will be soon, some force will have to be in 
readiness to augment the local police forces.  The State Police are doing 
well to maintain their share of the work at the present time They will 
need assistance then.  The responsibility for killing this act will lie with 
this group of men who I have heard before have continually blocked 
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efforts to pass legislation that I believe to be necessary. Petty personal 
grievances should be overlooked at this time of great emergency. 197 
 
The action at the State House was not the only drama for the day. A bomb 
scare during the day raised concerns the situation was about to turn explosive.  Police 
reported twenty-five sticks of dynamite were stolen from the St. James Cemetery in 
the Manville neighborhood of Lincoln. The Pawtucket Times claimed the theft was 
part of a communist plot to blow up the Diamond Hill Reservoir on the 
Cumberland/Lincoln border.  Cumberland Police officer James Bradley told reporters 
he was contacted by residents living near the Arnold Mill complex about three cars 
suspiciously parked nearby so he and members of the State Police stood guard by a 
dam near the reservoir.  Despite attributing the theft of dynamite to a “communist 
plot” there is no evidence to support the claim and there never was any explosion.198 
 Just before the General Assembly began its special session, Governor Green 
sent a telegram to every police department in the state to round up all known 
communists.199 The order was the culmination of a campaign, led by the governor and 
supported by both the UTW, the police, and the press, to blame the disorder on the 
communists. Earlier in the week, police arrested nine men from Boston outside of the 
Roger Williams Furniture Company on Pearl Street in Providence.  The men were 
affiliated with a union named the Independent Furniture Workers Union and detained 
after a search of their car revealed they had a night stick and a rubber hose, presumed 
by the police to be weapons.  When the police took the men back to the police station 
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for questioning, they contacted the Boston Police Department’s “Radical Squad” who 
informed them the union the men were affiliated with was “of a distinctively radical 
nature” and the men were “reds.”  When a lawyer from Boston, Louis Gurman, arrived 
at the police station to secure bail for the men, he too was detained until the “Radical 
Squad” in Boston confirmed his status as a lawyer.200 
Police also told reporters they were tracking the movements of another known 
radical, a Brooklyn, New York, woman named Ida Alter, who was seen talking to 
workers in the Olneyville factory area.  They referred to Alter as “an inflammatory 
talker and to be possessed of more education that the ordinary mill worker.”  Police 
believed she was associated with UTW organizer William Clark. The Police told 
reporters ``We have not connected any of these people with any communistic 
organization. We know, however, that some of them have decidedly radical 
tendencies.  What develops later remains to be seen.”201 
What developed later was a raid on the Communist Party headquarters at 447 
Westminster Street, Providence, around midday on September 13.  Police seized a 
truck containing more than a ton of paraphernalia and pamphlets, including 1000 
copies of The Daily Worker.  Six people were immediately taken into custody and a 
dozen more arrested later that day, including Lawrence Spitz, one of the men who 
disrupted the Labor Day speeches earlier in the month. According to police, the “reds” 
were organizing a march on the State House because inside the office on Westminster 
 






Street they found a mimeograph machine and thousands of flyers with the following 
message printed on them: 
Fellow workers: Today at the state legislature, the General Assembly is 
called into special session by Governor Green, who will ask for 
$100,000 to increase the State Police force to 500.  NOT ENOUGH 
BLOOD is on the governor’s hands yet - he wants more forces with 
which to attack the workers. TODAY- the workers must give their 
answer to the outrageous criminal shootings. TODAY - we must make 
the mill owners’ agents who sit in the State House respect the workers’ 
right their usual MASS PICKETS.  On this depends the success or 
failure of the strike.  This is a matter of bread and butter - OF LIFE 
AND DEATH. 202 
 
 Upon hearing the news of the arrests, Sylvia issued a public statement on 
behalf of the UTW: 
After receiving reports from field workers who were on the scene in 
both Saylesville and Woonsocket last night, when serious uprisings 
occurred, resulting in one man being slain and many wounded, the 
Rhode Island strike committee today went on record advising workers 
not to tolerate or have anything to do with communists who have 
invaded the Blackstone Valley strike area.  Reports from these same 
field workers have convinced us that communists imported into the 
strike area from New York, Boston, Lawrence, and Providence were 
solely responsible for the uprisings that took place both in Saylesville 
and Woonsocket.  
 
Communists, known for their extreme radical tendencies, and including 
some of the prominent leaders of that group, were active in both the 
Central Falls and Woonsocket disorders. It is our intention as members 
of the Rhode Island Strike Committee that the strike will continue in a 
peaceful manner, and, towards this end, we urge all members of the 
United Textile Workers of American to rid themselves of communists 
and their activities.203 
 
In response to the raids, the Communist Party-affiliated International Labor 
Defense sent a telegram to the General Assembly, demanding Governor Green be 
impeached for using the raids to stifle the rights of workers to organize and for 
 





ordering “cold-blooded shooting, clubbing, wounding and gassing of hundreds of 
these workers by National Guards, and has deputized gun-thugs.”204 There is no record 
of the telegram even being received, never mind read, by any member of the 
Assembly.  Of all of those arrested during the roundup, only one person, Irving Kaitz, 
admitted to being present in the Saylesville area, and he claimed his involvement was 
limited to throwing fourteen rocks in one of the melees. At the trial for the arrested 
communists on October 2, prosecutors presented no evidence any of the other 
arrestees were involved in the strike disturbances.  Only Kaitz was convicted on a riot 
charge while the others were convicted of petty crimes such as vagrancy.205 
     With the shutdown of the Saylesville mill, the closing of the chaotic special 
session of the General Assembly, and a roundup of suspected “reds,” Sylvia called a 
meeting of UTW leaders to discuss next steps.  The meeting took place at 9:00 Friday 
evening at the UTW union hall at 23 Broad Street in Pawtucket.  The group was 
smaller than usual, which is probably why it took place here instead of at the general 
strike headquarters at the Labor Temple. Despite purportedly being a “secret” meeting, 
the press was waiting for Sylvia to arrive. He told reporters: “we have made enough 
headway here so that there’s nothing to amount to anything in operation in Rhode 
Island. The State is tied up. And it will remain tied up until the mills settle with us.”   
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 The following Sunday, September 16, Charles Gorcynski was buried in Notre 
Dame Cemetery.  Thousands of people marched behind the funeral cortege following 
services at St. James Polish Catholic Church in Central Falls. The quiet on the streets 
of Saylesville held while the mill remained closed.  But if Sylvia’s claims that the 
mills were “tied up” it was surely with loose bonds, because on September 18, the 
Saylesville plant announced it would be reopening.206 By agreement between the 
UTW and the governor, picketing was allowed at the facility, but the union was 
limited to having only 140 people on the lines at any time.  They divided their 
numbers into seven groups of twenty, and they paraded in front of the facility, from 
Walker Street to Smithfield Ave. Although some employees of the bleachery reported 
their houses were hit with rocks the night before the re-opening of the facility, there 
were no disturbances at the bleachery itself and nearly all the Sayles workforce 
reported for duty as scheduled.207 
As other mills across Rhode Island began to resume operations, a commission 
appointed by President Roosevelt prepared to release a report on the national strike.  A 
three-person commission, originally appointed by the President on September 5, was 
chaired by former Republican governor of New Hampshire John Winant. The Winant 
Commission originally tried to arbitrate the dispute after Gorman made that 
recommendation on September 8.  Sloan from the textile employers group rejected the 
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idea outright on September 9; so Winant instead investigated the UTW’s claims about 
poor working conditions in the industry.208 
 On September 20, the commission released its findings. President Roosevelt 
said “The excellent report of the Board of Inquiry for the cotton textile industry 
presents findings and recommendations which cover the basic sources of difficulties, 
and does this in a way which shows the wholly fair and reasonable approach which the 
board undertook its task.”209  He then urged an end to the strike, saying “ I want to 
express the very sincere hope that all employees now on strike will return to work and 
that all textile manufacturers will aid the government in carrying out the steps 
outlined,” in the Winant Commission’s report.210 
 Among the commission’s recommendations were a directive to the Federal 
Department of Labor to do a statistical analysis of the union’s claims about poor 
working conditions and a directive to the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the 
economic status of the industry. The Commission then directed the agencies to report 
their findings to the President so he could make recommendations for wage 
adjustments for the workers.211 Winant’s report also made it clear the textile 
employers refused to arbitrate the dispute even though the union was willing to do so.  
The report was also critical of the textile industry’s self-appointed NRA Code 
enforcement committee. The report cited them for creating “widespread 
dissatisfaction” by using management representatives to investigate complaints by 
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labor against management which “cannot be defended from any standpoint consistent 
with the principles upon which the Recovery Act is founded.”212 
 UTW leader Francis Gorman was elated with the report, considering it a 
complete vindication of the union’s decision to strike.  Gorman told reporters:  
By the President’s order a copy of the report of the Winant board was 
presented to us tonight at the same hour the report was given to the 
newspapers.  It is impossible to digest in a few moments the contents of 
a report so voluminous.  My only comment at this time is that so far as 
I now understand the report, it is an indictment of management and 
indicates that the position of the union has been right.213 
 
When asked if this meant the strike was over, Gorman answered: “Until the executive 
council decides otherwise the strike will and must continue in full force.” He then 
announced he was calling the executive council together immediately to consider 
whether to call off the strike.214  
On September 22, the members of the UTW executive council met at union 
headquarters in Washington, DC, and formally voted to end the strike. AFL President 
William Green, who attended the executive council meeting, told reporters “It’s a 
victory for the workers.  The position of the textile workers has been completely 
vindicated.” Strike leader Gorman, reporting the vote to end the strike was voted 
unanimously by the executive council, declared “our strike has torn apart the whole 
unjust structure of (the) NRA.”  He telegraphed every local union in the country, 
announcing “your heroic strike ends in complete victory.”215 
 








The textile industry received the report with a shrug.  George Sloan announced 
the industry group would give the Winant Commission’s report “serious 
consideration”, but they never formally acted on any of its recommendations.216 
Across the country, workers took down their picket lines and began the process of 
reporting to work to restart the mills. 
     In Rhode Island, plants not yet open began reactivating and workers 
reporting for work.  At the Saylesville bleachery, management compiled lists of those 
arrested in the disturbances, thirty-seven people in total.  The list includes the 
arrestee’s names, ages, gender, and addresses.  Whether or not this list was to serve as 
a “blacklist” - workers not to be employed by the facility - is unclear.217 While some 
minor jousting between the union and employers about who should be reporting to 
work and when surfaced, the process generally proceeded without major controversy.  
On October 6, the Rhode Island AFL met in Newport, Rhode Island, for its 
annual convention.  The delegates were greeted by Mayor Mortimer Sullivan and apart 
from a delayed start as delegates made their way from across the state to Newport, the 
convention got underway with high spirits.  However, a controversy erupted on the 
first day when Rob Hill, a delegate from Carpenters Local 94, submitted to the 
resolutions committee a resolution condemning Governor Green for his actions during 
the strike. Hill took to the floor after formally submitting the resolution, reading it 
along with a statement to the convention: 
 As always when troops are used for police duty, lives were lost and 
many people were injured.  Had the strikers been allowed to picket the 
mills, as is their right, the necessity for calling the troops would not 
have occurred.  It was the refusal of those in control to allow the 
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strikers to picket the plants that caused the trouble.  As proof of this, no 
disturbance of any consequence took place after this right was 
recognized.  Charging that the disturbance was caused by communists, 
the governor copying the methods of the dictators of Europe, issued an 
order calling for the arrest of all known communists. According to the 
report in the press, 17 persons were arrested but the charge of rioting 
was placed against one person only.  The others were charged with 
being idle persons.  The police were unable to get sufficient evidence to 
connect them to the strike.  The governor is a candidate for re-election 
next November, but should be retired to private life for his actions 
during the strike, Therefore, be it: 
 
Resolved - WE, the delegates to the semi-annual convention of the 
Rhode Island State Branch of the American Federation of Labor, call 
upon all workers of the State to vote against the re-election of Governor 
Theodore Francis Green as Governor of the State of Rhode Island.218 
 
Green’s election was scheduled for the next month, November 1934. After Hill’s 
speech, the UTW’s McMahon addressed the delegates. He thanked them for their 
support in the strike, especially for their financial support, which he assured them the 
money was well spent.  Joseph Sylvia then took to the floor and told the delegates he 
placed no blame on Governor Green for what took place in the streets of Saylesville.  
Instead, he placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of Sheriff Andrews for 
unleashing his deputy sheriffs on the picketers. Unbelievably, he told the audience that 
Governor Green was not responsible for calling out the Guard and the picket lines had 
been peaceful until “political powers of the state” had sent the sheriffs to the mills.219 
 The next day, the delegates debated Hill’s resolution for over two hours.  Hill 
spoke in favor, as did a delegate named Ganz, representing the Newport Machinists’ 
local union. Ganz focused his argument on the governor’s round up of alleged 
communists, telling the audience “I am not a communist, but I respect their right to 
 





their opinions.  Green had no more right to order their arrest than to order the arrest of 
all labor leaders.”  State AFL President William Connolly spoke against the resolution 
from the floor, reminding the convention that the UTW leaders McMahon and Sylvia 
both praised Governor Green for his actions during the strike. In a moment of 
realpolitik, Connolly told the body, “If we pass this resolution, where are we going to 
get off going to the State House for legislation with a Republican governor?”220 
 Hill’s resolution failed and the convention voted to endorse Governor Green’s 
re-election. Governor Green was then introduced to address the convention. He 
praised the Rhode Island labor movement for bringing forth labor leaders like 
McMahon and Gorman. He told the delegates he heard no criticism of the State Police 
or the National Guard during the strike but heard plenty of complaints against the 
deputy sheriffs and said Andrews took his orders not from him, but from the 
manufacturers. Green said: 
 Two years ago, I included your entire 11 suggestions in my party 
platform and introduced bills in the legislature in their favor. If a more 
liberal instead of reactionary group were in control of our state senate 
they would have passed. I am proud of our Rhode Island labor and its 
leaders, who have become national figures, such as Thomas McMahon 
and Francis A. Gorman ...You have the answer in your power, the 
ballot box. In closing I again assure you of my cooperation and will 
welcome your suggestions.221 
 
The convention did pass a resolution calling for a ban on the use of the 
National Guard for use in labor strikes except in case of rioting or revolt. They also 
passed a resolution against “communistic disorders” and called for a committee of 
labor leaders to collect data on all communistic organizations and their activities. Prior 
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to adjourning the convention also passed resolutions against the organizing of workers 
along industrial lines in favor of the traditional craft union structure, and a resolution 
instructing the executive council to consider organizing women teachers into a unit of 
the American Federation of Teachers.222 
William Blackwood died of his wounds the day after the convention. His 
funeral took place at the First Baptist Church in Pawtucket the following Thursday, 
and he was buried in the Ballou Cemetery in Cumberland, Rhode Island.223 There is 
no record that the UTW acknowledged his passing and his grave, to this day, is 
unmarked. 
With the endorsement of organized labor secured, Governor Green 
campaigned as Roosevelt’s man in Rhode Island.  His opponent, Republican State 
Senator Luke Callan, tried to paint the governor as a coward for calling out the 
National Guard during the strike, but the message did not resonate with Rhode Island 
voters.  On election day, November 6, Governor Green was re-elected with fifty-seven 
percent of the vote.  224 
Governor Green was scheduled to be inaugurated on January 1, 1935, but party 
control of the Rhode Island General Assembly remained unresolved because the vote 
counts in three senate districts were contested, with some alleging fraud.  In what 
came to be known as the “Bloodless Revolution,” on inauguration day, Green and 
other Democratic Party leaders orchestrated, through a series of questionable 
maneuvers, for the Democratic Party candidates to be declared the victors in each of 
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the contested districts, giving the Democratic Party total control over the General 
Assembly.  Before the end of the day, the Rhode Island Supreme Court was replaced, 
and the Republican Party controlled offices of High Sheriff, Providence Safety Board, 
and Finance Commissioner eliminated. The Democratic Party established complete 
hegemony over the levers of power in the state.225   
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 The chapter in Richard Kelley’s book Nine Lives For Labor about the 1934 
textiles strike is called “The Union That Wasn’t There.” In this chapter, Kelly 
describes a worried Thomas McMahon being driven from a pre-strike meeting 
repeatedly muttering under his breath “a million mouths to feed.” Faced with the 
seemingly impossible task of leading a nationwide strike with a union that in recent 
months didn’t even have enough printed membership cards to sign up all of the 
workers who wished to join, the unrealistic expectations of the members of the union 
undoubtedly caused McMahon to shudder. 226  
Both nationally and in Rhode Island, the national textile strike of 1934 was a 
failure.  The union was completely unprepared to lead an operation on this scale and it 
never should have called the strike. From the end of the UTW convention in New 
York City in August 1934, through the duration of the strike, the operation lurched 
from crisis to crisis. This was especially true in Rhode Island.  In the UTW’s defense, 
it is not surprising things would be chaotic given the context of a national strike in an 
industry with less than complete union membership density. But even with the pre-
strike attention, most workers did not immediately answer the call to walk off their 
jobs in Rhode Island.  The first week of the strike evolved slowly, and even if we 
discount both the owners claims of continued operating capacity and the union’s 
counter claims of strike effectiveness, by the time Saylesville erupted it is probable as 
many as half of the textile workers in the state were still tending their machines. 
 




The UTW’s command of the situation in Rhode Island was challenged in other 
significant ways.  Though they won the support of the local AFL early on, other 
independent textile unions either ignored or reluctantly delayed the call to join the 
strike.  Sylvia had to explain to workers, seemingly through the management slanted 
press, that when the UTW called for the strike of all textile workers, it meant in all the 
connected industries, including bleacheries.  The workers in those connected mills, 
most of whom were not UTW members, did not receive the message in the way it was 
intended, if at all.  On the picket lines in Saylesville and elsewhere, the UTW had little 
control over the people engaged in either rioting or picketing, were ignored by the 
police and the people, and in many cases tried to distance themselves from the actual 
events on the streets. 
Given the UTW’s inept leadership of the strike in Rhode Island, it is highly 
questionable what happened in Saylesville was because the UTW specifically targeted 
that bleachery for closure. When the first pickets arrived at the Saylesville bleachery 
on September 7, three days after the strike began, the plant was not the only bleachery 
in the state still operating.  While some bleacheries did close, several others were still 
open, including the nearby Lincoln Bleachery and Dye Works of Lonsdale.  The 
Lonsdale operation was not as large as its neighbor in Saylesville, but with 600 
workers, it was no small outfit. Once the violence erupted in Saylesville local media 
turned their attention away from a running tally of what shops were open versus those 
that were closed; so, it is unclear what happened next with the other bleacheries. But 
despite the company’s insistence they were being targeted, a notion adopted by 




It is also clear Governor Green bumbled his way through the strike.  He changed his 
message about the strike on several occasions as he cast about for someone to blame for the 
violence, switching from blaming the reactionaries, who did seem to have a role to play in 
the violence, to the communists, who did not. The men under his authority did their best to 
ignore him and the elected members of the General Assembly undercut his authority.  It was 
only by making common cause with the UTW and the labor movement after the strike was 
over placing the blame on “communists” that Green’s reputation was spared. 
This event was not a “communist uprising.” The record clearly demonstrates 
even if certain members of the Communist Party were present on the streets of 
Saylesville, they played no leadership role whatsoever in the action. Only one member 
of the Community Party was ever charged in connection to the disorder.  The raid at 
the party headquarters on Westminster Street on September 13 is comically anti-
climactic, happening when the communists were planning a rally to protect the 
workers after the shooting stopped.  As Secretary of War Dern said to reporters when 
he was asked about the so-called communist uprising, “you must realize it’s a custom 
now to blame the communists for a lot of things.”227  
 Likewise, it is clear the uprising in the streets was not caused by 
“outsiders.”  If you recall, UTW leaders like Sylvia pleaded with Governor Green not 
to impose picketing restrictions, that they could operate the picket lines peacefully, 
and that any trouble in Rhode Island was imported from other states. The facts, 
however, make clear the vast majority involved on the streets were local people from 
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the surrounding area. One person from Connecticut was arrested during the 
disturbances in Saylesville, a few from the Boston area, but nearly everyone else 
caught and charged by the police lived within walking distance of the Saylesville 
bleachery.  Similarly, according to the list of casualties, most of their addresses are 
from the working class neighborhoods of Central Falls and Pawtucket.  
 Recall also how on the first day of violence in Saylesville, the UTW men who 
were there, Brunelle and Powers, tried to keep a group of you boys from throwing 
rocks at the plant and the sheriffs. In her interview with the University of Rhode 
Island’s Mill Worker Oral History Project of the mid 1970’s, local resident Rachel 
Landry told interviewers, when asked who was involved with the violence that it was 
“young fellas, I guess.”228 When Rita Brouilette, the 16-year-old girl from nearby Etna 
Street in Central Falls, was arrested by police, a wire service headline read “Just 
Having Fun Arrested Rioters Declare.”229 A sensationalized headline for sure, but not 
far from the mark. 
 What I believed happened on the streets of Saylesville was neighborhood riot 
caused by armed thugs provoking local youths into doing something foolish, which 
then escalated to the point of civil disorder.  Following the timeline of events on 
September 7 through 12, the flow of the action shows most of the violence started 
between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 in the afternoon, just as local schools released 
students, lulled around dinner time, and then resumed in the evening hours of late 
summer when the sun was still out and temperatures still warm. The action attracted 
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curiosity seekers, many of whom were likely strike-idled area workers, swelling the 
size of the crowd providing cover for young people to keep the fight against the 
sheriffs going.   
The political establishment used the violence on the streets to stake out 
positions serving their own needs, ascribing intentions fitting their own conclusions, 
and when the action was over, created narratives to protect themselves. Governor 
Green, mindful of how one of his predecessors lost re-election for mishandling a 
textile strike, seized the opportunity to take credit for the end of the violence.  The 
Rhode Island labor movement, ascendent with newfound allies in the early days of the 
New Deal, joined forces with Green and helped share his version of the story, 
complete with communist bogeymen.  
 For further evidence for how quickly the people involved tried to bury the 
story of the Saylesville Massacre, on January 30, 1935, the political establishment in 
Rhode Island held a Gala Ball to celebrate FDR’s birthday at the Exchange Street 
Armory in Providence, one of the mustering cites for the National Guard on their way 
to Saylesville.  UTW organizer Stella Moskwa was escorted to the event by Rhode 
Island’s Lt. Governor Robert Quinn and crowned “Queen of the Ball” by Democratic 
Party Boss Tom McCoy.230 The Democratic Party had much to celebrate.  In addition 
to surviving the strike, thanks to the maneuvering of McCoy and Green, the 
Democratic Party took complete control of the political order in Rhode Island. Green 
and McCoy’s coup in January of 1935 has come down to us known as the “Bloodless 
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Revolution” only because it was convenient to all involved to forget as quickly as 
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